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I. INTRODUCTION: GUN CONTROL FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE
Consider three transactions: (1) federal legislation passed by
Congress; (2) an order of judgment in a private lawsuit; and (3) a
contractual arrangement between private parties. If one were asked to
rank those transactions in order of the potential impact they should
1297

1298
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have on public and social policy, they would probably appear in the
order that they are listed. Intuition, experience, and plain common
sense might likely lead to the conclusion that legislation has the
greatest impact on public policy, private agreements the least,' and
final judgments in litigation somewhere in between. 2 Democratic
principles provide very good reasons for this ordering. On matters of
public policy lawmaking, the legislative process is supposed to provide
citizens with the participatory and representative clout guaranteed by
the Constitution. 3 Slightly farther down the continuum, the outcome
of litigation, while still a matter between private parties, is governed
by laws publicly enacted and by judges who are bound to use and
interpret those laws. Alternatively, private agreements have none of
these restrictions. Although principles of contract law prevent
agreements that baldly subvert existing laws or mores, 4 beyond the
scope of that restriction, they represent a free-for-all. Parties will (and
according to efficiency principles, should) bargain for the most
advantageous agreement and tend to think little about the costs to
society at large. 5
If we are willing to use these assumptions as a starting point,
gun control policy might help animate them. The discourse
surrounding the way we use and regulate firearms is nothing if not

1.
In fact, some scholars have complained that settlements have too little impact on public
policy and should be discouraged in the litigation setting because of the potential for the
sublimation of the public good. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2626 (1995) ("The point is simple: two parties trying to apportion a
loss are most likely to reach agreement if they can find a way to shift the burden to a third party
who is not present at the bargaining table.").
2.
Interestingly, one might also be willing to assume that a ranking of (1) legislation, (2)
judgment, and (3) settlement represents an inverse ranking of efficiency. Environmental
regulation, occupying something of a "most favored nation" status among public choice scholars,
demonstrates this phenomenon well. For instance, take the classic example of a factory emitting
smoke that pollutes the neighboring community. Law and economics analysis suggests that the
legal rules used to determine regulation of this problem could conform to efficiency principles,
namely, the solution the parties would have reached independently. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (2d ed. 1989). Although beyond the scope of
this Note, the fact that efficiency and public policy appear to be in tension with one another gives
one reason for pause.
3.
See U.S. CONST. art. I,.§ 2, cl. 1 (establishing a lawmaking House of Representatives
composed of officials elected by "the People of the several States").
4.
General principles of unconscionability permit a court to invalidate contracts that run
counter to public policy. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (1989) (noting that one of the purposes of the
provision is the "policing [of contracts] ... contrary to public policy").
5.
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that
"settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged
nor praised"); Luban, supra note 1, at 2648 (noting that "responsiveness [of settlement
agreements] to third parties who they may affect is at best dubious").
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public. Argued about by presidential candidates, 6 debated by
scholars,' and trumpeted by a million marching moms,8 there is little
room to dispute the fact that gun control is an issue that concerns and
affects many Americans. Moreover, the target of that discourseviolence allegedly caused by a lack of gun control restrictions-is not
just public, but a public tragedy. 9 Accordingly, using the assumptions
set forth above, Congress might be the best place to address public
concern about gun control, the courtroom less preferable, and the
bargaining table least preferable.
Given the magnitude of public concern about the problem, as
well as the magnitude of the problem itself, the legislature would
appear at first blush to be a good institution for resolving some of the
most troubling aspects of gun control. And, despite public perception
to the contrary, there has been interstitial progress on gun control
legislation in Congress the last ten years. 10 The rhetoric might suggest
otherwise, but federal legislative gun control efforts have made
considerable progress" when compared with the period of virtually

6.
In a vague exchange, Vice President Al Gore commented that "common-sense gun safety
measures are certainly needed," while then-Texas Governor George Bush commented, "We
keep-somebody, you know, illegally using a gun, there needs to be a consequence." Third
Presidential Debate, The Commission on Presidential Debates (Oct. 17, 2000), available at 2000
WL 1530401.
7.
See JOHN R. LOTT JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUNCONTROL LAWS 5 (1998) (arguing that the proliferation of firearms actually contributes to a
reduction in crime by producing a strong deterrent effect); Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against
the Gun Industry: A ComparativeInstitutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1249-51 (2000)
(considering the strengths and weaknesses of the market, the courts, Congress, and
administrative agencies as regulators of firearms); Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun
Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 63 (1992) (arguing that the ideas of legal scholars have yet to be
included in the current debate on gun control).
8.
Patterned after the 'Million Man March," the "Million Mom March" was a protest
conducted at Washington Mall in Washington, D.C. led by gun control advocates attempting to
persuade Congress to adopt stricter firearm legislation. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On Eve of Million
Mom March, Clinton Calls Mothers the Stronger Voice in Gun Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000,
§ 1, at 16.
9.
For instance, in 1987 alone, 32,000 people were killed with firearms, second only that
year to auto accidents as the leading cause of injury-related deaths. According to this same
study, firearm deaths will surpass auto accidents in the year 2003 as the leading cause of injuryrelated deaths. See Deaths Resulting from Firearmand Motor-Vehicle-Related Injuries-United
States, 1968-1991, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 37 (1994).
10. For example, in 1994, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 926 so that federal agencies could
promulgate regulations allowing them to store weapons obtained in crime-related seizures.
Violent Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2015 (1994).
11. At the forefront of this progress is the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). Although the centerpiece of this legislation, federal
background checks, is no longer good law, the remainder of the Act remains in force. Notably, the
Attorney General and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF') are empowered to
work towards a computerized instant background check system.
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nonexistent restrictions, and even some anti-restrictions, 12 in the
13
1970s and 1980s. Thorny federalism questions notwithstanding,
federal legislative efforts towards gun control experienced something
of a renaissance in the middle of the past decade. 14 Nevertheless,
legislative efforts also remained characterized by intense lobbying, led
by the National Rifle Association ("NRA"). 15 One of the few political
lobbies that is truly a household name, the NRA wields considerable
power and influence on Capitol Hill and continues to be successful in
blocking gun control legislation.16 Countervailing lobbying efforts have
emerged to challenge the NRA's supremacy, however, with increasing
success. 17 Whether blame is placed at the doorstep of the NRA or the
members of Congress themselves, public sentiment favoring firearm
control cannot be completely squared with the actual output of
legislation.1 8 But, as explained in detail in Part II below, the last ten

12. The Mc'Clure-Volkmer Bill, passed into law as the Firearm Owners Protection Act in
1986, contained a variety of provisions limiting the ability of the federal government to control
and monitor firearms. Among the Act's provisions were: (1) dropping the existing ban on the
interstate sale of firearms; (2) allowing convicted felons to own firearms if their crimes only
involved the regulation of business practices; (3) exempting dealers from record-keeping
obligations for ammunition sales; (4) prohibiting the government from barring the importation of
guns determined to be suitable for "sporting purposes"; and (5) requiring ATF agents to have
"reasonable cause" before inspecting a gun dealer's records. See OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER
FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN CONTROL 57 (1998).
13. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lopez, struck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 as exceeding the power inherent in the Commerce Clause to regulate state activity.
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). Again, in 1997, the Court invalidated portions of the Brady Act
requiring local police officials to comply with the federal background check provisions. See Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). Some have speculated that many local police will
continue to perform the background checks regardless of the Court's insistence that they cannot
be compelled to do so. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 291.
14. Id. at 291-93.
15. The NRA maintains broad sway in Congress. It was recently named by Fortune
magazine as the most powerful lobby in Washington, displacing a perennial powerhouse, the
AARP. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Fat & Happy in D.C., FORTUNE, May 28, 2001, at 94, 95.
16. Id.
17. Handgun Control, Inc. ("HCI"), led by Sarah Brady, has emerged as a measurable
counterbalance to the NRA's lobbying influence. HCI is the lobbying group largely credited with
the passage of the Brady Act, which is one of the most comprehensive firearm laws passed by
Congress. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 268-70 (describing the role of HCI in passage of the
Brady Act in the Senate).
18. See, e.g., Susan B. Sorenson, Regulating Firearmsas a Consumer Product, 286 SCIENCE
1481, 1482 (1999) (indicating that nearly 88% of Americans polled support making firearms
childproof); Stephen P. Teret et al., Support for New Policies to Regulate Firearms, 339 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 813, 814 (1998) (indicating that 80% of gun owners support laws for childproofing
and 59% support personalization of weapons); Newsweek Poll: Gun Control, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16,
1999 (noting 93% of the public support mandatory waiting periods for all handgun purchases,
89% support mandatory trigger locks, 74% support a universal handgun registration system, and
68% support outright ban on assault weapons).
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years have shown promise for gun control advocates, particularly
when contrasted with earlier efforts.
The courtroom, once uncharted territory for considerations of
gun control and firearm restrictions, has seen an increasing number of
lawsuits filed with the intent of creating restrictions on the way that
guns are bought and sold. 19 Beginning with the first lawsuit, filed by
the City of Chicago in 1998,20 these suits have spread to other cities
and municipalities with viral efficiency. 21 Occasionally, individuals
injured by firearms have brought these suits, but more often they
have been filed by cities seeking injunctions and compensation for the
health-care and other related costs of firearm-related injuries and
fatalities. 22 These lawsuits have proceeded on two well-established
theories of tort law: products liability and negligence. The products
liability lawsuits allege that existing technology 23 could be added to
firearms to make them safer and prevent accidents. 24 The negligence
lawsuits proceed on a slightly more complex theory. Those suits allege
that gun manufacturers negligently flood consumer markets with
firearms and then distribute them in such a way that they are
increasingly likely to end up in the hands of criminals. 25 One very
19. The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence lists at least twenty-eight pending lawsuits
based on challenges to existing gun control laws and gun manufacturers. See Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence, Litigation Docket, at http://www.gunlawsuits.com/ docket/index.asp (last
visited April 15, 2002).
20. Id.
21. Of the twenty-eight suits the HCI referenced, fourteen have been filed against cities or
municipalities. See id.
22. Id.
23. The sophistication of the technology runs from the mundane to the space age. "Smart
gun" technology allows the manufacturer of firearms that contain scanners and microchips to
recognize the unique fingerprints of their owners and prevent the gun from firing unless the
authorized user is handling the weapon. Gun control advocates have long asked for measures
considerably less complex, such as the distribution of trigger locks (not unlike locks on luggage
and briefcases) or the simple increase of trigger tension (so that small children do not have the
strength to pull the trigger). Prior to and during the initiation of these lawsuits, many gun
manufacturers have claimed that these measures, particularly the "smart gun" technology,
exceed the manufacturers' present scientific sophistication. This argument does little to address
persuasively the calls for the decidedly nontechnological trigger locks and trigger tension
increases. Nevertheless, firearms have incorporated advanced metallurgical technology since
1983, so that the barrel and handle of the weapon resist the deposit of fingerprints. This
technology was eventually outlawed.
24. Private lawsuits have tended toward this theory. See, e.g., Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
No. A093082, 2002 WL 187397, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002). The Dix complaint was filed by
the parents of a child killed by a firearm that the child believed was not loaded. See id. Although
the gun did not have a clip inserted, one bullet remained in the chamber. The Dix family claimed
that a chamber load indicator would have easily prevented the accident. The jury rejected their
claim 9-3 in favor of Beretta. Id.
25. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated sub.
nom Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
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significant judgment has emerged from these cases, handed down in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 26 a case whose impact will be discussed at some
length later in this Note. For now, consider only that the case involved
handgun
defendant
and twenty-five
merely six plaintiffs
27
manufacturers.
Prior to the year 2000, it would have been difficult to point to a
contractual arrangement that addressed gun control policy in any
meaningful way. On March 17, 2000, that changed; the U.S.
Department of Treasury, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), and representatives from thirteen states,
counties, and cities entered into a settlement agreement (the
"Agreement") with Smith & Wesson, the nation's largest
manufacturers of handguns. 28 In exchange for "full and complete
settlement of any and all claims that were raised or could have been
raised" 29 by the signing cities and states, Smith & Wesson agreed to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that monitors the way that the guns
are manufactured (addressing the products liability claims) and the
way they are bought and sold (addressing the negligent distribution
claims). 30 Any pending claims against Smith & Wesson were
dismissed with prejudice, and Smith & Wesson embarked on a major
overhaul of its business practices. 31 At the time the deal was
brokered, 32 parties both in opposition to and in favor of the Agreement

26. See id. As discussed infra Part III, the overruling of the district court in Hamilton does
not necessarily alter the potential importance of the decision. Because of the limited questions
certified to the state court, and the recognition of potential liability on different facts, the
precedential value of Hamilton may still be considerable in other jurisdictions and in New York.
See Allen Rostron, Products Liability: Gunning for Justice, TRIAL, Nov. 2001, at 26, 31 (arguing
that the overruling by the Second Circuit in Hamilton was based on the sufficiency of the
evidence, not on the merits of the legal rationale).
27. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
28. Sports.Rec, Settlement Agreement (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter "Agreement"], at
http://communities.prodigy.net/sportsrec/gz-s&w-hud.html.
29. Id. pmbl.
30. Id. §§ I, II(A)(1).
31. See Agreement, supra note 28.
32. The settlement was portrayed in the media as some kind of quasi-legislative action
taken by President Clinton against gun manufacturers. See A Breakthrough on Gun Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at A14 (stating that Smith & Wesson agreed to the settlement in
exchange for an agreement by President Clinton and other plaintiffs not to pursue a threatened
lawsuit). The Clinton Administration did have some influence over the terms that were finally
agreed to, but their deal is primarily a private arrangement; the federal government's role in the
settlement was largely one of brokerage. Additionally, despite the fact that all private
agreements are ultimately enforced by government intervention, the inclusion of the
enforcement provisions in the Agreement provided the Administration with a convenient
redundancy. In other words, the White House gets credit for enforcing an agreement that it
would have been obligated to enforce regardless.
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believed that it had the potential to shape public policy on gun control
33
in unprecedented ways.
Although it once appeared the Agreement might die of abuse, 34
it appears to have died instead of neglect. 35 With the change in
Presidential administrations, the Agreement has been dismissed by
HUD as a "memorandum of understanding," that will not be actively
enforced by the current administration.3 6 Meanwhile, Smith & Wesson
has been sold to Saf-T-Hammer, a company that manufactures gun
safety and security devices.3 7 Executives of Saf-T-Hammer have
refused to comment about any willingness to assume Smith &
Wesson's obligations under the Agreement. 38 While a focus on the
content of the Agreement remains important, 39 in light of its recent
demise, particular focus should be made on the procedure that
initially brought it to life. Moreover, to the extent that the Agreement
has been discarded by executive whim, there is still potential that it
could have renewed vitality if administration, or simple policy, begins
40
to change.
This Note argues that the Smith & Wesson Agreement
represented a dangerous privatization 4l of law that created a private
solution to a decidedly public problem. Accepting the pessimistic view
33. HCI has called the Agreement "a significant step toward comprehensive reform of the
gun industry." See Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Smith & Wesson Settlement, at
http://www.gunlawsuits.com/docket/smithandwesson.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). The NRA,
meanwhile, has been significantly less charitable. The NRA's chief lobbyist, on a web page
entitled The Smith & Wesson Sellout, calls the deal a "futile act of craven self-interest ...
jeopardizing an entire U.S. industry and undermining a constitutionally guaranteed right." See
NRA Institute for Legislative Action, NRA Condemns Smith & Wesson Sell-Out (Mar. 20, 2000),
at http://www.nraila.org/newscenter.asp?FormMode= Detail&ID=74.
34. After Smith & Wesson entered the Agreement, the NRA called on its membership to
boycott the already beleaguered company. That push was successful; company sales dropped
nearly fifty percent in the year following the agreement. Bruce Butterfield, Smith & Wesson Sold
to Safety Devices Maker BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2001, at E2.
35. See Gary Fields, White House Retreats from Smith & Wesson Deal WALL ST. J., Aug. 1,
2001, at A4 (stating that HUD is not enforcing the agreement).
36. Id.
37. Butterfield, supra note 34.
38. See id.
39. See infra Part III.A. (discussing specific details of the Agreement).
40. Susan Page, The Changing Politics of Guns-Democrats Back off on Firearms, USA
TODAY, Aug. 13, 2001, at IA. The newly-minted Bush Administration, in addition to disregarding
the Smith & Wesson Agreement, has also rolled back HUD provisions funding local police
departments in a program to buy back guns from their communities, and has directed the Justice
Department to adopt an individualized interpretation of the Second Amendment. Id. These
changes illustrate the flexibility of gun control policy that comes with changes in presidential
administrations.
41. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice,
65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (cautioning against unwarranted judicial intervention on public
choice grounds).
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that Congress is merely a proxy for private interests, the Smith &
Wesson Agreement went one step further by removing the proxy: it
implicitly undermined the ability of legislatures to make law on those
topics covered in the Agreement, and explicitly prevented the courts

from doing

So.

42

This Note proceeds in four parts. In Part II, this Note analyzes
the recent history of federal legislative efforts at reform of firearms
laws, examined through two competing public choice theories
regarding the contours of federal statutory control. 43 In Part III, this
Note explains the reasoning of the Hamilton decision, and why that
reasoning was so critical to the adoption of the Smith & Wesson
Agreement. 44 In particular, Part III offers the phenomenon of
"precedential cascades" or "herding" as an explanatory principle that
strongly suggests private regulation of gun control was, in part,
attributable to a fear of the Hamilton court's potential precedential
force. Part IV explains in detail the scope of the Smith & Wesson
Agreement and its potential impact on future gun control legislation
and litigation, as well as what the Agreement means for subsequent
democratic participation in this issue. Part V explains and applies the
Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard45 to the Agreement,
and argues that (notwithstanding executive neglect) courts may refuse
to enforce the Agreement as violative of the policies of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46 Ortiz provides a legal
rationale to vindicate the policy concerns raised in the preceding
sections. Lastly, Part VI offers some concluding thoughts about the

42. See Agreement, supra note 28.
43. Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1990)
(arguing that intense special interest group disputes, which threaten to damage a legislator's
political influence, help explain the delegation of certain lawmaking to state and local
governments); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice CaseAgainst the Line Item Veto, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 385, 402-06 (1992) (adapting models introduced by Michael T. Hayes and James
Q. Wilson in developing a framework for understanding supply and demand in legislation).
44. As noted earlier, there is still cause to believe that there was serious interplay between
the reasoning of Hamilton and the timing of the Smith & Wesson Agreement. Moreover, the
Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals both acknowledged the potential for
manufacturer liability given a more persuasive set of facts. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
264 F.3d 21, 30 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the New York Court of Appeals decision touched on
the "sufficiency of the evidence of causation"); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222,
237 (2001) ("The negligent entrustment doctrine might well support the extension of a duty to
manufacturers to avoid selling to certain distributors in circumstances where the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know those distributors are engaging in substantial sales of guns into the
gun-trafficking market on a consistent basis.").
45. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
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potential for redirecting gun control legislation and litigation away
from the bargaining table and back into public fora.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A. Lobbying Efforts and CongressionalResponse
Gun control lobbying without the influence of the NRA is like
Corn FlakesTM without the milk. Certainly, the NRA has been hugely
successful in blocking federal gun control laws over the last thirty
years. The NRA's numerous victories of the 1970s, 1980s, and early
1990s include blocking the federal ban on assault weapons,
maintaining the federal licensing fee for becoming a firearms dealer at
ten dollars, preventing federal legislation to close the "gun show
loophole," defeating regulation of firearms under ordinary consumer
protection statutes, opposing a federal ban on "Saturday night
47
specials," and whittling down certain provisions of the Brady Bill.
The NRA's influence had largely been in the form of a negative check:
instead of marshalling a majority to propose and approve a bill,
political persuasion was used to help block it.48 With the assistance of
several influential politicians in Congress, and considerable
cooperation from the Reagan-Bush led executive branch, 49 the NRA
maintained a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to meaningful
firearm legislation throughout the 1980s.50 Backed by a significant
pool of resources for campaign contributions, vocal and visible
leadership, and constitutional and patriotic rhetoric, the NRA had

47. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 60-78, 85-96. The Brady Act, although primarily a
multifaceted piece of legislation, requires, as a matter of federal law, that background checks be
performed on citizens attempting to purchase a handgun. See id. at 291. The background check
necessitates a five-day waiting period. Id. Davidson describes the NRA's role in the passage of
the McClure-Volkmer Bill, legislation that essentially prevented the federal regulation of the
sale of firearms. See id. at 60-78. The NRA had similar success in preventing the outlaw of
armor-piercing ammunition, despite strong support for such legislation by the police unions. See
id. at 85-96.
48. See id. at 128-41.
49. The specifics of executive participation in lawmaking are beyond the scope of this Note.
Suffice it to say, however, that Presidents Reagan and Bush played an active role in the gun
control legislative process simply through the exercise of the veto power. Between the two,
Reagan and Bush vetoed seven acts of Congress designed to produce stricter gun control. Id. at
206-12.
50. See id. at 219-236.
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long been the poster child of effective interest group lobbying. 51 It
52
continues to have formidable influence.
Until the early 1990s, there was an absence of an organized
constituency to play ying to the NRA's yang. The rising tide of firearm
violence, however, coupled with the NRA's public mishandling of key
events, allowed for opponents of the NRA to demonize them and
mobilize opposition. 53 Two series of events helped typify the changing
tide of public support: the FBI raid on the Branch Davidian compound
in Waco, Texas leading to the Oklahoma City bombing, and the
Columbine High School shootings. 54 The sequence of events beginning
with the federal raid on the Waco compound, and leading to the
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, caused significant
damage to the NRA's public image, because it created a firm and
55
factual association between the group and militant extremists.
Timothy McVeigh, an active member of the ultra right-wing "Michigan
56
Militia," executed the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma.
The NRA, in a disavowal later proven false, denied ties between itself
and the Michigan Militia. 57 Former President Bush considered the
NRA's official statements and mishandling of events following the
Oklahoma City bombing so egregious that he publicly resigned his
lifetime membership in the group. 58 If the Oklahoma City bombing
can be said to have damaged the public's conception of the NRA's
philosophy and associations, the reaction to the succession of mass
51. Most notable is, of course, NRA President Charlton Heston. An inexhaustible repository
for controversy, Heston's six-year tenure as president of the NRA has attracted considerable
attention from both proponents and detractors.
52. See supra note 15.
53. DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 293-95.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 293-98. Although opponents of the NRA had often characterized the group as
'extremist," the NRA remained quite effective in combating this image by co-opting the role of
constitutional defender. See id. This argument, however, was largely directed to the rhetoric and
philosophy of the NRA, not their actions. See id. But, the Oklahoma City bombing gave this
argument evidentiary bite, if only circumstantial. See id. The Branch Davidians were initially
pursued for firearms violations; they had compiled a significant stockpile of weapons within their
compound. The legality of this stockpile called into question the relative wisdom of the laws that
allowed it. The Oklahoma City bombing, two years after the Waco raid, was eventually
attributed to Timothy McVeigh. Id. at 293. McVeigh was tied to the Michigan Militia, an antigovernment organization that supported the NRA, and had in fact conducted meetings with
high-level NRA officers. Id. at 294-95.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In reaction to an NRA fundraising letter characterizing the BATF as "jackbooted thugs"
and "Nazis," Bush castigated the group, seething "your broadside against federal agents deeply
offends my own sense of decency and honor and it offends my concept of service to country ...
[and] I resign as a life member of NRA." Letter From George Bush to Thomas Washington,
President, NRA (May 3, 1995).
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gun attacks at Columbine High School did corollary damage to the
59
public's conception of its policies.
Using firearms bought legally by a straw purchaser, two high
school students went on a rampage through Columbine High School
on April 20, 1999, leaving thirteen people dead and twenty-three
injured. 60 The ripple effect following the Columbine tragedy extended
to a variety of public issues, 61 but none was more acute than gun
control. 62 Once again, the NRA was at the center of the firestorm,
issuing statements regarding the tragedy that were later proven false
and refusing to cancel its annual meeting in Denver, scheduled only
two weeks after the Columbine incident. 6 3 The opportunity to decry
the NRA's handling of events post-Columbine created an opportunity
for gun control advocacy groups, whose political clout had been rising
prior to these incidents, to gain national attention. More importantly,
it signaled to legislators that supporting or being perceived to support
the NRA would have new-found political consequences. 64 By the end of
the 1990s, with a charge led by Handgun Control, Inc., it was clear
that anti-firearm lobbying efforts had forged a constituency in
65
Congress that boded well for future gun control legislation.
B.

Application of Wilson-Hayes Model and Macey's Federalism

Given the now existing competing interests for and against gun
control legislation, public choice may provide some insights on what to
expect from the legislative process on the federal level. Public choice
analysis based on the Wilson-Hayes model of costs and benefits
suggests an undersupply of legislation when both the costs and

59. Columbine is perhaps the best-remembered and most discussed of the school massacres
of 1999. See Clinton Calls Summit on Youth Violence, HERALD, May 1, 1999, at 16. But,
shootings at schools in Springfield, Oregon and Jonesboro, Arkansas had already begun to
stimulate public discourse regarding the current status of firearm laws.
60. Sam H. Verhovek, 2 Are Suspects; Delay Caused by Explosives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1999, at A28.
61. In addition to changes on gun control policy, the events at Columbine High School have
also had a noteworthy impact on the way that police respond to crisis and hostage situations.
62. See Allison Mitchell & Frank Bruni, Suburban Districts Seen as Key in the Debate over
Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at Al (describing the pronounced impact the shootings
at Columbine were predicted to have on gun control legislation); Katharin A. Seelye, Killings in'
Littleton Pierced Soul of Nation, Clinton Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A23 (same).
63. The NRA eventually scaled back its meeting from three days to one, in a halfhearted
attempt at diplomacy. Karen Lowe, Shooting Victims to Protest Gun Lobby Convention,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1, 1999.
64. Stolberg, supra note 8. The impetus of the Million Mom March, for example, was the
perceived lack of congressional reaction in the wake of the Columbine shootings.
65. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 291-92.
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benefits of legislation are widely distributed. 66 Gun control, however,
illustrates the one-dimensional nature of the Wilson-Hayes model; it
does not account for the varying perspectives of the parties vying for
legislation. In other words, deciding whether costs and benefits to
legislation are wide or narrow may vary depending on whether you
support or oppose the law at issue. To the proponents of gun control
legislation, the benefits of the legislation are widely dispersed;
namely, if gun control laws have their intended impact, everyone will
benefit from a reduction in crime, less accidental shootings, and fewer
tax dollars for related public health costs. 67 Moreover, to the gun
control proponent, the costs can also be construed as widely dispersed;
everyone agrees to submit to stricter regulation in exchange for
greater safety.
Opponents may have very different interpretations of the exact
same law. On one hand, the costs of such legislation may be
characterized as narrow because the burden of compliance with new
laws falls squarely and acutely on the shoulders of those persons who
use firearms most often: hunters, recreational shooters, and those who
purchase handguns for safety concerns. Here, however, we can also
see that the model may break down based on the chronology of the
legislative process. Before proposed restrictions on firearms are passed
into law, NRA members may tend to characterize the costs of such
legislation as widely dispersed, as we all suffer a vague constitutional
harm. 68 Such a characterization not only accurately captures their
66. See Stearns, supra note 43, at 402-06 (arguing that the amount of legislation produced
by Congress can be roughly estimated by considering the intensity and focus of the lobbying
interests and the impact of the proposed legislation).
67. The U.S. General Accounting Office, in a report commissioned by the Senate, reported
that simple safety devices in the firearm could have prevented an estimated thirty-one percent of
unintentional firearm-related deaths. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE No. GAO/PEMD-91-9,
ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS: MANY DEATHS AND INJURIES CAUSED BY FIREARMS COULD BE
PREVENTED (1991). Similarly, public health care costs associated with firearm violence are
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars for large cities. Brady Campaign to Prevent
Gun Violence, Reforming the Gun Industry: The Chicago Lawsuit, amended Complaint at 76-77
(estimating the costs of gun-related health care costs in the Chicago area to exceed $850 million),
at http://www.handguncontrol.org/lap/cities/ chicago.html, (last visited Sept. 22, 2000). National
costs may approach $126 billion a year. Ted R. Miller & Mark A. Cohen, Costs of Gunshot and
Cut/Stab Wounds, 29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 329, 336 (1997). Couple these
numbers with those that suggest that many patients hospitalized with gunshot wounds are cared
for out of the public fisc, and the benefits of cost reduction are clear. See Mary J. Vassar,
Hospitalizations for Firearm-Related Injuries, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1734, 1736 (1996)
(concluding that as many as eighty-one percent of those treated for gunshot wounds lacked
private insurance).
68. Second Amendment freedoms are a favorite reference point for pro-firearm lobbyists,
especially the NRA. See U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.");
NRA Institute for Legislative Action (describing lobbying efforts as protecting our most "beloved
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sentiments about the law; it also effectively draws into the fold a
greater number of opponents. But, if the legislation is passed, NRA
complainants may then suggest that the law is a narrow restriction on
69
the rights of gun and sporting enthusiasts alike.
On the benefits side, gun control opponents frequently argue
that such legislation provides little or no protection to the citizenry
because stricter gun control does not help curb crime or other societal
ills caused by the proliferation of guns. 70 Thus, according to opponents
of gun control, the benefits are extremely narrow in that they are
either nonexistent or negative. Against the backdrop of these
conflicting perspectives, it is difficult to use the Wilson-Hayes model
effectively to capture the reasons for interstitial progress regarding
gun control.
So, something besides the Wilson-Hayes model is needed to
explain Congress's role accurately in providing federal restrictions on
firearms. Jonathan R. Macey posits that principles of federalism and
the economic theory of regulation can better help explain the output of
federal legislation. 71 Macey builds his argument around a central
assumption of the economic theory of regulation: politicians in
Congress will supply legislation (or block it) for the group that can
provide them with the greatest amount of political support. 72 He uses
this assumption to support his thesis that because of this Congress
will "franchise" legislation to state governments if one of three
situations is present: (1) a state has developed a body of law that
demonstrates its particular expertise in an area (corporate law in
Delaware, for example); (2) voter preferences vary dramatically across
regions (so that the legislation would foster great support from certain
states, and great opposition from others); and (3) Congress can avoid
"potentially damaging political opposition from special interest
groups" by refusing to legislate on highly controversial issues.7 3 Macey
argues that gun control fits most accurately in the second category, of
varying political preferences across regions. 74 Perhaps this
freedoms" including those that NRA supporters believe are contained in the text of the Second
Amendment), at http://nraila.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
69. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 37-81. In a chapter titled One of the Great Religions of
the World, the author describes the NRA's sophisticated and successful lobbying strategies. See

id.
70. In fact, some opponents of tighter restrictions on gun control argue that the widespread
use and ownership of guns actually prevents crime, and that tighter restrictions will produce an
attendant upswing in criminal behavior. See, e.g., LoTT, supra note 7.
71. See Macey, supra note 43, at 281.
72. Id. at 284.
73. Id. at 268-69.
74. Id. at 281.
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categorization was accurate in 1990 at the time that Macey's article
was published. In the aftermath of Oklahoma City and Columbine,
75
however, support for gun control has outgrown its rural roots.
Moreover, geographic disparity in gun control laws is often cited as a
contributing factor in the trafficking of firearms-a compelling and
independent basis to normalize restrictions on the purchase and sale
76
of firearms across jurisdictions.
Thus, neither the Wilson-Hayes model nor Macey's federalismbased argument fully explain or justify an abandonment of federal
legislative efforts. Given the current atmosphere, Congress would
seem a more appropriate venue now than in past years. In fact,
Congress has recently produced a fair amount of federal legislation
restricting firearms.7 7 The Brady Bill has matured into the Brady Act,
and despite certain provisions being struck down in Printz v. United
States,78 the majority of the act remains in force. A federal assault
weapons ban was passed in 1994, closing previous loopholes that
allowed buyers simply to purchase pieces of the weapons in
circumvention of existing laws. 79 Nevertheless, the concentration of
activity regarding gun control has not remained in the federal
legislature, and seems to have drifted into its sister branch, the
judiciary.
III. GUN CONTROL LITIGATION-THE INTERMEDIARY STEP TO
PRIVATIZATION
The loci of activity for gun control over the past three to four
years have instead been the courtrooms. Urged on by the relative

75. See Page, supra note 40 (noting that support for gun control measures is viewed by
legislators as an issue that has begun to transcend geographic boundaries).
76. Tracing of firearms used in crimes indicate that many were purchased legally, and

connections have been made to show that guns often travel from jurisdictions where their
purchase and sale are less restricted to jurisdictions where their purchase and sale are more
restricted. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE
YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE: PERFORMANCE REPORT 13 (1998); see also Fox

Butterfield, New Data Point Blame at Gun Makers: Fewer Criminals Stole Their Weapons than
Thought, Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1998, at A8.
77.

DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 291-93.

78. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (forbidding the use of police as "conscripts" in the enforcement
of the Act's background check provisions). The Brady Act commandeered local law enforcement
to perform the task of background searches for handgun sales. The Court held, per Justice
Scalia, that Congress's enlisting of local law enforcement to execute a federal statute violated
separation of powers and federalism principles of the Constitution. Id.
79. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1973 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924).
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success of big tobacco , litigation 8 0° individuals, 8 ' cities, 8 2 and
municipalities8 3 have filed a variety of lawsuits alleging products
liability and negligence claims against the manufacturers of firearms.
As discussed earlier, the' products liability lawsuits have been
premised on the theory that gun manufacturers have refused to
implement and use feasible existing technology that they know would
make handguns safer.8 4 These claims have thus far been met with
little success, although there are many claims still pending that are
premised on this theory.8 5 The alternative theory maintains that gun
manufacturers have negligently breached their general duty of care to
the public by selling and distributing guns in such a way that the guns
are very likely to end up in the hands of criminals.86 This theory was
briefly sustained in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, a case that could still have
important implications for the way that firearms are bought and
sold.8 7

-

Hamilton was filed in the Eastern District of New York, and
the court in Hamilton applied state law to the' substantive claims
asserted by the plaintiffs.8 8 The plaintiffs in Hamilton 9 were six

individuals who had either sustained serious injury due to gunshot

80. See, e.g., Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 63-64 (1997); see
also Roberto Suro, Cities Plan Legal Assault on Makers of Handguns, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1998,
at A8 (discussing the similarity between the tobacco and planned firearm litigation).
81. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
.82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
84. See supranotes 23-24 and accompanying text.
85. The products liability claim in Hamilton was dismissed against all manufacturers. 935
F. Supp. 1307, 1321-1324 (E.D.N.Y 1996). The appeal in Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. may
ultimately prevail on this claim. See No. A093082, 2002 WL 187397 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002).
86. See supra notes 26, 44.
87. See supra notes 26, 44.
88. See 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); supra note 44.
89. As indicated, the Hamilton litigation proceeded in two parts. Initially, the plaintiffs
asserted products liability claims against the defendants and also made the novel argument that
the lobbying efforts of the defendant gun manufacturers constituted fraud. See Hamilton, 935 F.
Supp. at 1314-15. Both of these claims were dismissed on defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 1332. The fact that the plaintiffs even attempted to argue that the legislative
efforts of the manufacturers (and by proxy, the NRA) amounted to fraud suggests the intensity of
the lobbying efforts. The court noted: "Plaintiffs cite the role of the NRA in coordinating lobbying
activity and the manufacturers' reliance on the NRA's efforts against gun distribution

regulations." Id. at 1316. But, consistent with earlier assertions made in Part II, the court
ultimately concluded that "federal firearm policy cuts a high profile in national debate ...[and]
groups on all sides pursue their interests With vigor in the political and regulatory arena." Id. at
1321 (applying the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine which holds that lobbying alone cannot form the
basis of liability).
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wounds or were relatives of those killed by firearms. 90 The defendants,
twenty-five handgun manufacturers, constituted the vast majority of
firearm makers whose products are sold and distributed in the United
States. 91 By relying upon well-established 92 notions of tort law, the
Hamilton court issued a detailed fifty-one page opinion containing a
three-part holding: (a) the manufacturers of firearms owe a duty of
care to the general public to guard against the criminal misuse of their
product by monitoring the sale and distribution of firearms; (b) the
manufacturers' breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries; and (c) when the identity of the gun manufacturer
is unknown, manufacturers of all firearms can be held responsible on
93
a theory of collective liability.
The defendants appealed the district court's decision to the
Second Circuit, 94 and the court of appeals certified questions of state
law to the New York Court of Appeals. 9 5 The New York court accepted
and responded to two questions: "(1) [w]hether the defendants owed
plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and
distribution of the handguns they manufacture? [and] (2) [w]hether
liability in this case may be apportioned on a market share basis, and
if so, how?" 96 The New York Court of Appeals answered both questions
in the negative, 97 and based on those state law conclusions, the Second
Circuit reversed the district court. 98 The New York Court of Appeals
focused its analysis on the lack of evidence of causation, which
attenuated any link between the injured plaintiffs and the handgun

90. 62 F. Supp. 2dat 808-10.
91. Id.
92. The legal precedent relied upon by the court in reaching its decision reads like a torts
greatest hits collection. The significant tort decisions cited by the court include the following:
United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (creating risk/utility analytical
framework); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611 (1980) (establishing theory of enterprise
liability predicated on market share); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88 (1948) (holding that
when two or more actors are responsible for a negligent act, the burden rests with the defendants
to disprove their culpability); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345 (1928)
(describing limits of proximate cause); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389 (1916)
(establishing theory of duty for foreseeable injuries caused by manufacturer's negligence). The
use of well-known precedents is important to the application of the theory of "precedential
cascades" below.
93. 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824, 835, 846.
94. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000).
95. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 230-31 (2001).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 240, 242.
98. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2001).
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manufacturers. 99 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals was

reluctant to adopt a theory of market share liability because of the
potential for ballistics or other evidence to firmly link a particular
manufacturer to the injuries of specific plaintiffs. 10 0 The court was
very specific, however, in noting that the legal rationale for imposing a
duty on handgun manufacturers was still an open question in New
York and that it was the insufficiency of the factual rationale that
undermined the claim for negligence in this case. 1 1 The reversal of
Hamilton, of course, undermines its effect as binding law, but it may
not necessarily undermine its persuasive authority. 10 2 Both the state
and federal court opinions noted that there is still potential for the
imposition of a legal duty on gun manufacturers, assuming that a
03
plaintiff could produce evidence of greater causation.
Because the reasoning of the Hamilton district court decision
may still have potential merit, 0 4 a further analysis of that rationale is
warranted. When the Smith & Wesson Agreement was signed,
Hamilton was still good law. 105 Therefore, all three parts of the
original Hamilton holding still contain implications for the application
of the theory of "precedential cascades" and the outcome of the Smith

99. Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 237-38 ("Without a showing that specific groups of dealers play
a disproportionate role in supplying the illegal gun market, the sweep of plaintiffs' duty theory is
far wider than the danger it seeks to avert" (emphasis added)).
100. Id. at 240-41 ("Unlike DES, guns are not identical, fungible products. Significantly, it is
often possible to identify the caliber and manufacturer of the handgun that caused injury to a
particular plaintiff.").
101. Id. at 240, 242 ("In sum, analysis of the State's longstanding precedents demonstrates
that defendants-given the evidence presented here-did not owe plaintiffs the duty they claim
...Whether, in a different case, a duty may arise remains a question for the future." (emphasis
added)).
102. See Rostron, supra note 26, at 31 ("The New York Court of Appeals decision addressed
only negligence claims and expressed no views about gun manufacturer liability on any other
cause of action.").
103. Hamilton, 264 F.3d at 31 (rejecting plaintiffs' request for additional discovery to
produce evidence to "cure the defect" in its case); Rostron, supra note 26, at 31.
104. Hamilton, 264 F.3d at 31; Rostron, supra note 26, at 31.
105. The Smith & Wesson Agreement was entered into on March 17, 2000. See supra note 28
and accompanying text. The district court in Hamilton issued its decision on June 3, 1999.
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The certified questions were not
answered in state court until April 26, 2001, over a year after the Smith & Wesson Agreement
was finalized. Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 222. The Second Circuit did not formally reverse Hamilton
until August 31, 2001. 264 F.3d at 23. Coincidentally, news of the breakup of the Smith &
Wesson Agreement under the Bush Administration occurred at roughly the same time as the
Second Circuit overruled the district court's decision in Hamilton. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
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& Wesson Agreement, and merit detailed analysis.1 0 6 The following
discussion focuses on the district court's legal rationale in Hamilton.10 7
A.

Imposition of a Legal Duty

The plaintiffs argument in support of imposing a duty was
premised on expert testimony and empirical evidence that
manufacturers of firearms pay little attention to the nature of the
retailers that sell their products. 108 Although the channels of
distribution of the firearms used by the manufacturers were formally
legal, because of the laxity of the existing regime, nominally legal
distribution was nonetheless tantamount to negligent distribution. 109
In establishing a duty by the manufacturers to the plaintiffs, the
district court did not set forth novel principles. Rather, it relied on
well-worn notions of the duty of care and applied practical
reasoning. 110 Rejecting any argument that imposition of a duty would
give rise to strict liability, or even excessive liability, the court noted
that manufacturers could "reduce the risk of criminal misuse by
ensuring that the first sale was by a responsible merchant to a
responsible buyer."'' More importantly, the district court went on to
counsel that under a negligence scheme, gun manufacturers could
satisfy their duty by "marketing and distributing their product
responsibly."' 12 The district court reasoned that the ordinary duty
owed by a manufacturer in the sale and marketing of its product was
heightened even further in the case of firearm manufacturers that
distribute an intentionally lethal product. 113
106. See infra Part III.D.
107. 62 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
108. See id. at 829-33. Interestingly, some of the most damning testimony on this came from
a Smith & Wesson executive. Smith & Wesson had been dismissed as a defendant earlier in the
case based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 53, 82
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). In a deposition taken-prior to Smith & Wesson's dismissal, Robert Hass, an
executive with the company for eleven years, conceded that "the manufacturers could do more
and their hands aren't clean if they ship totally legally to distributors. There's more that could be
done." Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
109. Although superficially counterintuitive, the notion that compliance with existing laws
may fall short of the duty of care is a well-established tort doctrine. See Jemmott v. Rockwell
Mfg. Co., 216 A.D.2d 444, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). The Hamilton court acknowledged as much,
noting that "[tiechnical compliance with all relevant laws and regulations is not dispositive."
Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
110. See id. at 818-28.
111. Id. at 820.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 821 (noting the axiomatic proposition in Palsgrafthat " 'the risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation' " (quoting Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344 (1947))).
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The duty created in Hamilton imposed liability on gun
manufacturers for the first time. So, in that sense, the duty portion of
the holding is novel. But, the district court remained very deliberate
in grounding the duty in preexisting tort doctrines, giving the opinion
the feel of a modest step forward, rather than a radical departure from
existing doctrine. 114 Citation to previous cases that denied the
existence of such a duty was used sparingly. Compounding this
authority is the fact that the opinion was issued by a federal court
seated in New York, and authored by Senior District Judge Jack
Weinstein, the source of several important tort opinions and a
jurisdiction and judge considered particularly sophisticated in the
field of tort law generally. 11 5 Finally, while the duty imposed was quite
general, the court gave future defendants a specific course of action to
follow in order to avoid liability in future suits.116 These moves helped
to normalize an otherwise dramatic departure from existing doctrine.
B. Breach of Duty and Proximate Cause
Over the defendant's demurrer, the district court assigned the
determination of both the breach and causation to the jury, and the
jury determined that both elements were satisfied. 117 The opinion
placed a great emphasis on the amount of material evidence
supporting the jury's finding. Particularly persuasive was expert
testimony that traced a large number of handguns used in crimes to
purchases made by licensed dealers.1 1 8 Although the court would have
114. Despite the complexity of the issues, Judge Weinstein characterized the plaintiffs'
claims as a traditional tort action. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 818 ("To prevail on a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements under New York law: (1) that
the defendant owed him or her a duty of care, (2) that the defendant breached this duty by
engaging in conduct posing an unreasonable risk of harm and (3) that the defendant's breach
proximately resulted in damage to the plaintiff.").
115. Scholars have argued that, because New York City was a birthplace of industry (and
attendant injury), the emergence of authoritative tort doctrine from that jurisdiction was a
logical consequence. The influence of Justice Cardozo, particularly in the area of tort law, also
plays a large role in New York's legal preeminence in 'this field. See William E. Nelson, From
Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York: 1920-80, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
117, 118, 133 (1999). Judge Weinstein himself was the subject of a 1997 Symposium in the
Columbia Law Review, discussing his preeminence in the field of torts. See John C.P. Goldberg,
Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034,
2035 (1997) (describing Judge Weinstein's contributions to the law as imparting "compassion and
common sense into the proceedings before him"); see also David Luban, Heroic Judging in an
Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2065-69 (1997) (describing the unique and invaluable
contribution of Judge Weinstein as a judicial activist).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 832-33.
118. The court cited testimony provided by Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, a professor at Columbia
University's School of Public Health, who provided the results of an intensive study regarding
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allowed the jury to find that the manufacturers had constructive
knowledge of the negligent sales, that inference was not necessary. In
fact, testimony from a trade association for the firearm industry
supported the notion that gun manufacturers were aware that
firearms purchased via "legal" sales were often being used illegally
due to a lack of supervision at retail outlets. 119
The court's analysis on this point focused less on existing
precedent, as its only task was to conclude that the facts available to
the jury were sufficient to leave their conclusions undisturbed. The
court did, however, analogize the behavior of the gun manufacturer to
that of large tobacco companies in helping to justify an otherwise
uncommon extension of proximate cause. 120 Furthermore, the court
did not credit the argument that the intervening cause of the criminal
act severed the manufacturers' chain of causation. 21 Rather, the court
reasoned that, based on existing doctrine, the failure to take steps to
guard against a clearly foreseeable criminal act is negligence. 2 2
Again, the court's detailed analysis on this point, particularly when all
that was required was a mere affirmation of the reasonability of the
jury's conclusions, seems conscious and deliberate. Although civil rules
do not require juries to make detailed explanations of the reasons for
reaching their conclusions, the court seemed happy to take up the
torch for them, either for the benefit of the parties, future litigants, or

both. 123

the interplay between firearms and the escalation of violence. Id. at 836. Noting that gun-related
violence tended to spread more rapidly than non-gun-related violence, Dr. Fagan likened the use
of firearms to a deadly pathogen. Id. at 837. Joseph J. Vince, former chief of the Crime Gun
Analysis Branch of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, corroborated this testimony
and provided a causal link to the manufacturers by citing data that most guns used in crime "
'are not stolen firearms' " [and that] " 'the majority of the time we are seeing [criminals] getting
them from retail sources.' " Id. at 830.
119. Id.
120. Quoting language from the leading New York mass tort tobacco case, the district court
reasoned that the policies behind extension of proximate cause in that case were similar to the
policies invoked by the court in Hamilton. Id. at 833. The court noted, "It is difficult to imagine a
set of circumstances that would militate more strongly in favor of a finding of proximate cause
... than the present one." Id. (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Phillip Morris, 36 F. Supp. 2d
560, 584-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
121. See id. at 833-34.
122. See id. at 834.
123. See id. at 828-35.

THE DISAPPEARING SETTLEMENT

2002]
C.

1317

Collective Liability and Apportionment of Damages

Although perhaps not initially obvious, firearms used in violent
crimes often go unrecovered. 124 Even when an assailant is arrested,
the weapon will likely already be disposed of, as it tends to be the
most damning piece of evidence in a criminal prosecution. 125 The
plaintiffs in Hamilton were faced with this difficult problem of proof.
None of the weapons used against the six plaintiffs were ever found,
leaving them with a serious evidentiary problem. 126 The defendant
manufacturers argued that unless the weapon could be attributed to a
specific manufacturer, no damages could be assigned. 127 The only clue
guiding the plaintiffs and the court was the caliber of the weapon
used; no other evidence existed to link the guns with the responsible
8
manufacturers.12
Once more invoking bedrock tort precedents and policies, 129 the
court adopted a modified version of collective liability to hold all
potential manufacturers liable where attribution remained in
question. 130 Citing moral grounds, deterrent effects, superior ability of
defendants to absorb and minimize costs, and the need for evolving
theories of recovery, the court set forth several alternative recovery
schemes. 31 First, if neither party could attribute the gun to a
particular maker, all firearm manufacturers would be responsible for
damages at the rate of their share of the firearm market.1 32 Second, if
124. If the perpetrator of the violent act is not apprehended, of course, the gun will almost
never be recovered. As of 1994, only sixty-four percent of murders are "cleared" (i.e., suspect
caught, arrested, and convicted). One can therefore surmise that a substantial number of guns
used in crimes are not found. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
CRIME DATA STATISTICS 1984-1994, (1998). These figures only included reported crimes, leaving
one to suspect that the numbers are even more dramatic.
125. For a discussion of the importance of firearms as evidence of crime, see Robert Joling,
An Overview of Firearms Identification Evidence for Attorneys I: Salient Features of Firearms
Evidence, 26 J. FORENSIC SCI. 153, 154 (1981).
126. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 809-10.
127. Id. at 839-41.
128. Id. at 844 ("The caliber of such guns is often ascertainable from bullets in bodies and
shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. Ballistics can help to further refine the universe
of potential manufacturers.").
129. The court cited, most notably, Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80 (1948), and Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980), both of which supported a notion that between an
innocent plaintiff and many negligent defendants, the burden is justifiably placed on the
defendants. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 839-41.
130. The court, however, did not adopt enterprise liability. That is, defendants could
exculpate themselves by offering clear proof that they could not have manufactured the weapon
used in the crimes asserted (if for instance, a firearm company only made .45 caliber handguns,
and a .25 caliber weapon was used in the crime). Id. at 843-45.
131. See id. at 841-43.
132. Id. at 845.
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it were proven that a specific manufacturer made the gun in question,
that manufacturer would bear one hundred percent liability. 13 3 Third,
if the class or caliber of gun used could be attributed to a group of
manufacturers, they would share liability based on their market share
for that class of weapons. 13 4 Note that the court was seemingly more
moderate in the volatile damages arena. Under each of the court's
three methods, -defendants may still exculpate themselves and
therefore avoid liability, even if their practices are negligent. Those
manufacturers with the largest portion of the market, however, have
the greatest risk of a judgment against them under any of the three
35
methods.
D. Principlesof Herdingas Applied to Hamilton
The theory of precedential cascades, or herding, is based in
culture, not the law.. Commonly referred to as an "information
cascade" outside legal circles, the theory asserts that actors may
rationally decide to follow the actions of others based on the
(sometimes incorrect) assumption that those previous actors had a
more complete universe of information when they made their decision;
thus, simply copying their actions is the most efficient way to act. In
other words, "If everyone else is doing it, I should be doing it too."
Used to explain a variety of cultural and economic phenomena, the
theory of information cascades has great purchase in social science
and economic literature. 136 As applied to the law, the theory uses

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Smith & Wesson is by far the largest gun manufacturer in the United States, with a
market share varying between nineteen and forty percent of the total gun sales in the United
States. Consumer reaction to the Agreement, however, has apparently begun to erode that
dominance. See Editorial, Smith & Wesson Misfires, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at A16.
136. See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) (identifying an informational cascade as a situation
when people with incomplete information base their beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others);
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (discussing applications of data showing the prevailing preference for the
status quo in most "real decisions"); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and
Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990) (explaining that while herding may be inefficient in
the context of corporate investment, the stock market, and decisionmaking within firms, it can
be rational from the perspective of managers who are concerned with their reputations in the
labor market). The theory may help explain shifting in the market caused by consumer indices,
conforming to social trends such as recycling, and following even more basic trends such as
fashion. It may even help to explain why five million people purchased the second Spice Girls
record. See Edna Gundersen, Bubblegum Stars Chew on Effects of Fleeting Fame, USA TODAY,
Nov. 14, 2000, at D5. Sadly, sales of their third record, Forever, have been lackluster. Only
39,000 units had sold in the U.S. as of November 16, 2000. Perhaps this suggests that all
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precedent as the information exchanged, and acceptance of that
precedent by future judges as following the herd.137 Although the
phenomenon has superficial efficiency in that it allows future judges
to reach decisions without repeat deliberations, scholars applying the
model to the law pessimistically conclude that the cascades will lead to
inadequate judging as future decisions rely too heavily on precedent
and ignore the differences of the case at bar. 138 The theory of herding
may therefore have two important implications when applied to
Hamilton. First, it may help to explain the Hamilton court's judicious
use of precedent in crafting an opinion. Second, and more importantly,
it may provide some predictive insights as to how future courts might
treat Hamilton, despite the subsequent overruling by the Second
Circuit, and the incentives that potential treatment may have
provided to Smith & Wesson.
A fundamental principle of herding is that judges may
wrongfully rely on precedent that is inapplicable to the case at bar. 39
Opponents of the Hamilton decision had ample ammunition to level
that criticism against the opinion. Indeed, whenever existing doctrines
are applied to new fact patterns, as in Hamilton, the opportunity to
make that charge abounds. The manufacturer defendants in Hamilton
argued, 40 ultimately successfully,' 4 ' that the tort principles used were
never meant to apply to the makers of firearms who sell a wholly legal
product through lawful channels. Moreover, they contend that the
applicability of the tobacco litigation as an analogy is questionable,
both because gun manufacturers were at worst negligent, not
fraudulent, and because gun manufacturers do not have the amount of
cash resources needed to absorb liability and implement preventative

cascades, even precedential ones, eventually reach the shore. See Cesar G. Soriano, Spice Girls
Hit Bland Note on Chart, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2000, at D1.
137. See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades:An Appraisal, 75 CAL. L. REV. 87, 90-92 (1999)
(describing the phenomena of precedential cascades based on a theoretical model where
succeeding judges will follow the decisions of prior judges in areas of law where they presume
their predecessors have greater expertise); see also Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.

Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999) (applying the theory to a specific set of precedent culminating in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
138. Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 137, at 161; Talley, supra note 137, at 132-33.
139. Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 137, at 161; Talley, supra note 137, at 132-33.
140. In fact, a collective of gun manufacturers produced television spots for the presidential
election, under the moniker 'Vote Your Sport." Those ads claim that courts are inappropriately
making
inroads
into
regulation
that
exceed
their
scope
of power.
See
http://www.voteyoursport.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (showing a copy of the advertisement).
141. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2001) (overruling the district
court as discussed).
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monitoring strategies. 142 Thus, from the defendant's perspective, the
principle of herding may help explain why the court reached its
decision through an overreliance on inapplicable precedent. From the
plaintiffs perspective, however, the ruling is more fairly described as
a case of first impression, and thus, a consideration of its future value
is needed.
The more valuable insight of herding is the predictive
implications it has for the Hamilton decision, particularly because the
case has yet to be considered by courts outside of New York. In
theoretical models of the herding phenomena, the first judge (Ji) in a
series of cases is ruling on a case of first impression. 43 A second judge
(J 2) relies on that precedent, even when it is nonbinding persuasive
precedent, based on the assumption that J1 considered the relevant
facts and made a reasoned decision. At this point, an additional
assumption may be added to strengthen the model. Further assume
that J 2 will rely on Ji's decision to an even greater extent if J's
opinion relies on proven precedents and if J is located in a
jurisdiction that is considered to have some unique authority on the
body of law invoked and the facts presented by the case. If J 2 is
presented with a case similar to the one decided by J and the two
strengthening conditions are present, J 2 will quite likely apply the
approach laid out by Ji. Moreover, all subsequent judges (J3, J4, J 5
etc.) will continue to follow the precedential path initially set out by
Ji. As that path becomes more deeply entrenched, factual differences
in the cases presented to J3, J 4 , and J 5 will be minimized in order to
144
follow the established path.
With this model in place, the implications of Hamilton become
quite clear. Despite the manufacturer's contentions to the contrary,
145
Hamilton is likely to be viewed as a case of first impression.
Furthermore, the strengthening assumptions in the following model
are all present: (1) Hamilton is built around an existing body of
established precedents; (2) the state of New York, and Judge

142. Estimates place the firearm industry's annual collective sales at approximately $2
billion; the costs to the tobacco industry simply to settle claims brought by the states are
expected to exceed $100 billion. See Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to
File Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al.
143. See Talley, supra note 137, at 94-95.
144. See generally id. (explaining that "[t]he principal task for each succeeding judge ... is to
announce a legal rule that shall govern a given class of cases in the jurisdiction during the
coming period").
145. Even before the results of the Hamilton litigation were announced, gun manufacturers
seemed intent on barring potentially harmful litigation. See, e.g., Sharon Walsh, NRA Moves to
Block Gun Suits, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at Al (describing NRA and gun manufacturer
cooperation to block city lawsuits).
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Weinstein in particular, are widely considered authorities on tort
law; 146 and (3) the management of crime in New York City is a factual
condition that gives further weight to the decision. The reputational
bias' 47 presented in herding literature further suggests that
subsequent judges may be inclined to follow the Hamilton decision in
future gun control litigation. Although the opportunity for reliance on
Hamilton as binding precedent ended with the Second Circuit's
reversal of the district court's holding, the rationale of that decision
can still be used to form the basis of some duty in future gun control

lawsuits. 148
The most powerful evidence in support of herding is that Smith
& Wesson, the nation's largest gun manufacturer, believed so strongly
in the potential force of Hamilton that they were willing to try to
contract out of its implications altogether. 49 The explanatory
application of herding (explaining the gun makers' contentions that
the court in Hamilton relied too much on inapplicable precedent,
particularly in analogizing firearms to tobacco) and the predictive
application of herding (predicting that future courts may use
Hamilton as a guide in subsequent gun control litigation) are
superficially in conflict but are actually quite reconcilable. Both
applications rely on the premise that courts rely heavily on precedent
to make decisions in cases of first impression and politically charged
cases. Both applications also suggest a fear that the decision carried
serious consequences for the firearms industry, especially Smith &
Wesson, who entered into the Agreement on the heels of Hamilton and
exited it contemporaneously when the Second Circuit overruled the
lower court decision.150
IV. PRIVATIZING PUBLIC POLICY-THE SMITH & WESSON AGREEMENT
Smith & Wesson was arguably the manufacturer with the most
to lose through threatened enforcement of Hamilton because of the

146. See supranote 115 and accompanying text.
147. Subsequent judges may decide cases based on precedent even where those precedents
conflict with a judge's individual inclinations. Reputational bias suggests that judges do so in

order to avoid the appearance that their decisions are influenced by political or personal
preferences, instead preferring to create the impression that existing law guides their decisions.
See Talley, supra note 137, at 105-06. That bias may be particularly acute when the nature of the
case is highly politically charged, as with gun control.
148. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Complaint, Jefferson v. Rossi (Phila. County Ct. Com. P1. 2001) (No.
002218) (seeking damages for child injured by defendant manufacturer's weapon, alleging
negligent distribution of firearm through an illegal gun trafficker).
149. See supra note 105.
150. See supra note 105.
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nature of the liability theories.1 51' Facing the implications of judicial
and legislative acceptance of Hamilton, most gun manufacturers took
traditional routes by attempting to lobby for protection via prohibition
of future lawsuits, 152 and actively fighting plaintiffs in pending
lawsuits. 153 Smith & Wesson took the road less traveled; breaking
ranks from its fellow manufacturers and refusing to tow the NRA's
policy line, 154 it took a proactive approach by settling all claims
pending against it and adopting a variety of self-imposed regulations
55
that drew it within the bounds of the duty expressed in Hamilton.
Although the NRA has attempted to dismiss the settlement as the
insignificant act of a corporate Benedict Arnold, the implications may
156
run much deeper for both sides of the issue.
A.

Conditions of Surrender

The Agreement that the parties reached places two basic
obligations on Smith & Wesson: (1) terms dictating the safety and
design of firearms; and (2) terms dictating the sales and distribution
of firearms. 57 The Agreement also contains provisions for oversight by
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms ("BATF") to monitor
compliance with the Agreement, and it further provides that Smith &
Wesson will support legislation that purports to reduce firearm
misuse. 158 Although the primary consideration on the contract was the
dismissal of pending and future litigation, subsequent events

151. As explained, at the time of the Hamilton decision, Smith & Wesson carried the largest
market share of all handgun manufacturers. See supra note 135. A liability theory that allocated
liability in proportion to market share would naturally implicate Smith & Wesson to the largest
degree. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 840-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing the
applicability of market share liability to mass tort cases).
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. Describing the costs of these suits to gun makers, the NRA has suggested that the suits'
true purpose is to "bankrupt a lawful industry with exorbitant legal expenses." NRA Institute for
Legislative Action, Courts Reject Lawsuits Against Gun Makers (Oct. 15, 2001), at
http://www.nraila.org/FactSheets.asp/?FormMode=Details&ID=37 (on file with author).
154. Smith & Wesson has drawn considerable criticism from those camps for that course of
action. See Dave Boyer, NRA Aims Gun Range at Heart of New York Times Square, WASH.
TIMES, May 20, 2000, at Al (describing NRA's decision not to include a Smith & Wesson exhibit
in its new Planet Hollywood style restaurant and museum in Times Square).
155. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 819 (describing the scope of the duty as one that requires
manufacturers to "market and distribute their product responsibly").
156. See supra note 33.,
157. Agreement, supra note 28, §§ I-II.
158. Id. §§ IV-V.
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suggested that Smith & Wesson received slightly more in the
15 9
bargain.
The terms requiring greater safety measures closely mirror the
products liability claims asserted in numerous cases filed against
handgun manufacturers. 160 Smith & Wesson agreed to incorporate
technology that would make its guns safer when they leave the
factory. 16 1 Among the measures that, Smith & Wesson pledged to
incorporate within the next three years were provision of external and
internal locking devices, "smart gun" technology, chamber loading
indicators, and rejection of large capacity magazines. 162 Although the
terms of the contract provide a timeline for the implementation of
specific measures, it conspicuously lacks provisions for enforcement
upon breach. 63 Nevertheless, the terms agreed upon were
considerably more stringent than those required by judicial or
1 64
legislative proclamation.
The sales and distribution provisions are similarly
comprehensive. First, they require Smith & Wesson to monitor its
65
retail outlets more closely, sell only through storefront operations,

159. Shortly after the agreement with Smith & Wesson was finalized, the White House
issued a press statement that generated significantly less fanfare. In it, the White House pledged
$600,000 in grants to Smith & Wesson to assist it in developing "smart gun" technology.
President Clinton Promotes Smart Gun Technology to Protect Children from Gun Violence, at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/textonly/WH/New/html/20000531-4.html (last visited May 12, 2000)
(on file with author).
160. See supra note 24; see also Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 843-46 (discussing the
products liability claims later dropped from the complaint); Smith v. Bryco, 33 P.3d 638, 644
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for gun manufacturer on design claims,
noting potential liability based on "straightforward assertions that the handgun could have-and
therefore should have-incorporated long-known design features which would have helped
prevent this shooting and others like it").
161. Agreement, supra note 28, § I(1)(a) ("Safety and design ...standards applicable to all
handguns").
162. Id.§ I(1)(a)-(e) & (2)(d)-(e).
163. See id.§ VIII. The enforcement section of the Agreement has no discussion of provisions
in the instance of breach, merely noting briefly that "[tihe Agreement will be entered and is
enforceable as a Court order and as a contract." Id.
164. The lack of existing precedent perhaps explains the lenient terms in the safety
provisions of the Agreement. Because Smith & Wesson was under no threat of outside
enforcement of safety measures, self-regulation on a generous timeline without enforcement
provisions may have been a considerably unthreatening approach. Given the subsequent
provision of research dollars, the concession may have been more than just conservative-it may
have been profitable.
165. The longstanding provision licensing firearm dealers issued a license for a ten dollar
annual fee. DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 291. As a result, the overwhelming number of firearm
sellers are "kitchen table" dealers. Id. Although licensed, they sell weapons in small quantities
and in informal settings where background checks, serial number registration, and other
monitoring procedures are rarely used. See id. In 1993, President Clinton signed an Executive
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and not to distribute at gun shows. 166 Second, Smith & Wesson also
agreed generally to turn over its records of future sales to the BATF
for tracking purposes. 167 Finally, Smith & Wesson agreed to track
sales through its retailers and to discontinue distribution upon a
showing that the retailer may be engaging in sales that violate the
Agreement. 168 To enforce that provision, distributors of Smith &
Wesson firearms must adhere to a "code of ethics" that essentially
prevents them from selling weapons when they suspect they are being
purchased for criminal purposes. 69 The timing of the Agreement,
however, provides a two-year window before all the sales and
distribution terms are enforced. 170 Gun manufacturers and the NRA
have, of course, decried the Agreement as a threat to constitutional
freedom. 171 Proponents of gun control have welcomed the Agreement
as real progress, tempered with some hesitant skepticism. But there
are reasons for parties on all sides, and especially nonparties, to be
concerned not just about the content of the Agreement, but the process
that produced it.
B. Behind Closed Doors-Implicationsof the Process
Regardless of where one falls on the political spectrum,
whether a supporter or opponent of gun control, public choice theory
counsels that the Agreement reached may leave everyone worse off in
the long term. The potential harm to gun manufacturers is obvious;
some have already conceded that they are under pressure to agree to
similar terms. 172 But, there are more serious consequences. When
Order, increasing the licensing fee to $200. Id. Within five years of the change, the number of
federally licensed firearm retailers was reduced from 286,531 to roughly 90,000. Id.
166. Agreement, supra note 28, § II(A)(1)(d) ("Make no sales at gun shows unless all sales by
any seller at the gun show are conducted only upon completion of a background check.").
167. Id. § III(B) ("To the extent consistent with law and the effective accomplishment of its
law enforcement responsibilities, ATF will work with the manufacturer parties to the Agreement
and the Oversight Commission to assist them in meeting their obligations under the
Agreement.").
168. Id. § II(E) ("If ATF or the Oversight Commission informs the manufacturer parties to
this Agreement that a disproportionate number of crime guns have been traced to a dealer or
distributor within three years of the gun's sale, the manufacturer(s) that have authorized the
dealer or distributor to sell guns will either immediately terminate sales to the dealer or take
[administrative] actions.").
169. Id. § II(C)(2) (agreeing "[n]ot to engage in sales that the dealer knows or has reason to
know are being made to straw purchasers").
170. Id. § II(A)(1)(e) ("Within 24 months of the date of execution of this Agreement, maintain
an inventory tracking plan for the products of the manufacturer parties to this Agreement ... .
171. See supra note 34.
172. Beretta's General Counsel Jeff Reh claims that Beretta was pressured to enter into a
similar agreement by the withholding of sales to law enforcement, a large portion of their
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public policy matters are taken private, four concerns arise: (1)
restrictions are placed on who is at the bargaining table; (2) the freerider problem is exacerbated, as individual actors further solidify their
rational assumption that their participation is unnecessary; (3) the
expressive function of the law is diminished; and (4) the entities, both
the regulators and the regulated, that sign such agreements are
exculpated.
Assigning the label "public policy" begs the question: issues
bearing that moniker are intended for resolution through public
means. The efficiencies of the Smith & Wesson Agreement are beyond
question. Its terms were reached more rapidly and with exponentially
less deliberation than a similar agreement produced via legislation or
even litigation. 173 The Agreement was reached, however, only after a
process that excluded input from a wide variety of sources. Among the
voices left out of deliberation: strict Second Amendment adherents,
like the NRA; lobbying groups in favor of restriction, such as the
Center for the Prevention of Handgun Violence; and individuals
directly harmed by firearms, like the plaintiffs in Hamilton. Although
the inclusion of these voices may be less efficient, it is more
democratic. Regardless of the fact that the Agreement may be more
toothless than it now appears, it fails to carry the weight of consensus
formed by the nature of the legislative process. As argued in Part II,
the atmosphere is now particularly conducive to federal legislation,
but future efforts along the lines of the Smith & Wesson Agreement
may already be co-opted. 174 The explicit terms of the Agreement, of
course, make it highly unlikely that any court will ever be able to pass
judgment on the negligence of Smith & Wesson. The language of the
Agreement placed against the language of Hamilton provides a shield
against future litigation that is unlikely to be pierced.1 75 Moreover, the
Agreement was given judicial sanction by the courts of the cities that
are party to the deal. Given the market share theory suggested in
business. See Jeff Reh, Beretta Statement on the S&W Agreement, at http://www.nraila.
org/FactSheets.asp?FormMode=Details&ID=ll1 (Sept. 5, 2000).
173. The Brady Bill, a cornerstone of federal regulations, took eleven years to become the
Brady Act. Its exact contours are still being developed. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 269-70.
The Hamilton litigation lasted over four years from the date of the filing of the complaint until
the issuance of the governing opinion. (The complaint was filed in January 1995. The standing
opinion was issued in June 1999.) That decision may yet be appealed.
174. See supra Part II.
175. The Hamilton court plainly noted that "manufacturers can avoid liability by marketing
and distributing their product responsibly." 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Nothing in
the Second Circuit's decision would seem to upset the ability to guard against liability with such
measures. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 27 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the New
York Court of Appeals had discretion to address any question of state law touched on in the
Hamilton opinion).
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Hamilton, and Smith & Wesson's large market share, future litigants
may have been deprived of a major source of recovery.
Privatization of this type of public policy does little to help the
existing free-rider problem, which in turn contributes to political
apathy. Many people already refuse to participate in the political
process based on the rational assumption that their voices will either
not be heard or their concerns will be voiced by other parties. A
primary outlet for combating that apathy is lobbying and participation
in groups that seek to implement their desired vision of legislative
policy. Although the NRA could be subject to a variety of criticisms, it
is difficult to say they foster apathy. But, when the voices of these
participants are silenced or ignored, incentive to participate is
diminished even further.
This silencing leads to a more philosophical, but no less
serious, basis for viewing this and similar agreements with
skepticism. In addition to the practical and obvious function of law as
a mechanism for regulating behavior, law has what has been labeled
an "expressive function. '' 176 This function assumes that law takes on
177
meaning because it embodies a series of preferences and values.
Private agreements rob the law of that value; they embody nothing
more than the compromise desired by the parties to the agreement.
Public proclamation on gun control policy takes on specific
importance, if only because of the intense preferences on either side.
Legislation is also, arguably, a barometer of the majority's present
constitutional values. At the very least, it provides us with a road map
or signal as to what expression is predominating. Those functions are
rendered impotent when private agreements take the place of public
law.
More seriously, the implementation of private regulatory
schemes exculpates both the regulator and the regulated. Legislators
do not just have an option to create public policy; they have an
obligation to create it. Similarly, when a case is brought before a
judge, the court is obligated to make a ruling. Private agreements
frustrate these objectives. At best, the Smith & Wesson Agreement
provides legislators with a twelve-month to three-year window to defer
consideration of legislation that might accomplish the objectives of the

176. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 91 (1997) ("A unifying theme for
the discussion is the expressive function of law. When evaluating a legal rule, we might ask
whether the rule expresses an appropriate valuation of an event, person, group, or practice.").
177. Id. (arguing that the expressive function of law matters both in "the effects of law on
social attitudes and in the use of law to decide what sorts of consequences matter for legal
purposes").
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Agreement. 178 At worst, it provides legislators with an indefinite
delegation of the problem to parties whose failures cannot and will not
be traced back to Congress. It also precludes a uniform system of
regulation designed to combat the trafficking ills noted by the
Hamilton court and numerous gun control policy scholars. 179 As
discussed earlier, there is little doubt that the Agreement had the
potential to protect Smith & Wesson against future judgments, given
the potential scope of liability at the time of the district court's ruling
in Hamilton. Smith & Wesson, aside from the direct benefits,18 0 was
transformed from pariah to sacred cow in the stroke of a pen (at least
in the eyes of the Clinton administration). By adopting "voluntary"
measures 8 1 (that it suspected Were looming), it took on the
appearance of compassionate corporate saint, without fear of reprisal
from future legislation or litigation if it failed to satisfy the terms of
the Agreement. 8 2 Potential agency problems also abound when the
unitary branch of government attempts to act in a lawmaking capacity
on behalf of a citizenry that is supposed to be represented by a
legislature.18 3 The potential binding effect of the Agreement on parties
not present during bargaining provides an important analytical link
8 4 The rationale of
between the Agreement and Ortiz v. Fibreboard.1

178. The various enforcement provisions of the Agreement didnot take force until twelve to
thirty-six months after its execution. See Agreement, supra note 28.
179. In approving the jury's finding of causation, the Hamilton court observed that:
The jury could also have credited the extensive documentary and oral evidence
presented with regard to the flow of guns-particularly from the states of the
southeast, where, experts testified, it is relatively easy to purchase a gun, to the
states of the northeast, where it is relatively difficult to obtain one-and the high
proportion of New York crime guns traceable to out of state.
62 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
180. See infra note 247.
181. The motivations for Smith & Wesson to accept the terms of the Agreement, although
complex, probably included the threat of verdicts and regulation. See Mike France & William C.
Symonds, Can Gunmakers Disarm Their Attackers?, Bus. WK., Nov. 10, 1997, at 94, 94 (quoting
Richard Feldman of the American Shooting Sports Council that the support of gun
manufacturers for child safety locks is "because it puts the manufacturers in a better position in
front of a jury" because "[w]e could never take the kind of hit tobacco could take and survive"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Leslie Wayne, Gun Makers Learn from Tobacco Fight, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec, 18, 1997, at A18 (stating that voluntary provision of child safety locks was "smart
politics in the face of what would have happened" because "[iln just a few years, Congress would
have required it").
182. In fact, the Agreement goes one step further by providing two-tiered protection: under
the Agreement, individual retailers will be first held accountable in breach. Agreement, supra
note 28, § II (B)-(E).
183. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1259-60
(1984) (arguing that extension of vicarious liability is based on misapplication of agency
principles that lead to economic inefficiency).
184. 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see supranote 33 and accompanying text.
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Ortiz mirrors the foregoing criticism of the Smith & Wesson
Agreement: private parties were able to make contractual
arrangements binding upon entities absent from the bargaining
85

table.1
V.

ORTIZ AND RULE

23(B)(1)(B) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE

Within months of the execution of the Agreement, alarms were
sounding as to its legality.8 6 Most of the arguments offered against
the Agreement focused on potential constitutional violations,
particularly potential Second Amendment18 7 violations.1 88 The
arguments that focus on treatment of the Agreement as law contain a
simple yet important error. The Agreement is not a statute; it is a
settlement. Thus, the proper basis for attack must be precedent that
defines the acceptable limitations of settlements, not precedent that
defines the limitations of law. 8 9 Legal deconstruction of the

185. The Ortiz Court noted that "[tihe legal rights of class members ... are resolved
regardless of either their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their express wish to the
contrary." 527 U.S. at 847.
186. Notably, the Agreement has been attacked as illegal under application of antitrust laws
and contrary to the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See James H. Warner, Municipal
Anti-Gun Lawsuits: How Questionable Litigation Substitutes for Legislation, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 775, 787-90 (2000) (making the aforementioned antitrust and Contracts Clause
claims). While not intending to discredit Mr. Warner's legal analysis, it seems worthwhile to note
that he is Assistant General Counsel for the NRA. Id. at 775.
187. The oft-quoted Second Amendment provides, "A well-regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST., amend. II. The amount of scholarly discourse surrounding the precise meaning of the
Second Amendment would fill many volumes of law reviews. A Westlaw search turned up thirtyfive articles with "Second Amendment" in their titles in 1998 and 1999 alone. There is no
Supreme Court case that points directly to the scope of the Second Amendment as a defense to
tort claims. See generally Jerry J. Phillips, The Relation of Constitutionaland Tort Law to Gun
Injuries and Deaths in the United States, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1337 (2000) (attempting to define the
proper role of the Second Amendment in tort lawsuits). While beyond the scope of this Note, it
seems safe to assert that there is not a consensus among scholars or courts that would shed
definitive light on the potential constitutionality of the Agreement.
188. See Warner, supra note 186, at 784.
189. A common attack on settlements generally builds on this point. Because settlements do
not create rules of law that legally bind future parties, they lack the public good provided by
adjudication. Future litigants gain the benefit of the rules created by their courtroom
predecessors, without having to contribute their own resources to the creation of those rules. See
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1080-81 ('The authority of judgment arises from the law, not from the
statements or actions of the putative representatives, and thus we allow judgment to bind
persons not directly involved in the litigation even when we are reluctant to have settlement do
so." (emphasis added)); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 240 (1979) (arguing that state controlled adjudication is needed to prevent
the underproduction of rules and precedents caused by an overuse of private dispute resolution);
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requires reliance on an analogous settlement that has been
repudiated by the courts. Ortiz v. Fibreboardprovides the
settlement and the precedent needed to confront the
on legal grounds.

A. Ortiz v. Fibreboard and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlement Agreements
Ortiz v. Fibreboard was the second in a line of cases closely
examining mandatory settlements of class actions under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 190 The Ortiz Court focused
almost exclusively, however, on the "limited fund" provision of Rule
23(b)(1)(B). 191 The defendant, Fibreboard Corporation, faced billions of
Luban, supra note 1, at 2623 ("[A]djudication may often prove superior to settlement for securing
peace because the former, unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents.").
190. 527 U.S. at 821. Only two years earlier, the Supreme Court reviewed another class
action settlement of asbestos claims in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)
("Amchem"). The Court's analysis in Amchem took under review subsections 23(a), (e) and
23(b)(3). Id. at 597. In order to proceed with a class action, a reviewing court must "certify" the
class to ensure that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a)'s
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation are meant to
protect members of the class who are not present in the litigation but will be bound or affected by
its outcome. Those four requirements ensure that: the number of members in the class are so
great that requiring individual actions would be too burdensome; the factual and legal basis of
the class members claims are sufficiently in common so that they can all be adjudicated in the
same proceeding; the claims of the present class members are typical of the claims of those
members not present; and that counsel representing the class can do so without significant
conflicts of interest between present and absent class members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee's notes (a)-(b)(1). A judicial hearing is required under Rule 23(e) to approve a
settlement of a class action. Called a "fairness hearing," Rule 23(e) requires that the court
carefully consider the impact that the proposed settlement will have on all affected claimants
and decide if the settlement is "fair, reasonable and adequate." Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 604 F.
Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
Rule 23(b)(3) is the provision of Rule 23 allowing a limited number of class members to "opt
out" of the class. Class members exercising their opt-out rights sacrifice any stake in the
judgment or settlement of the class action litigation in exchange for the opportunity to bring
their own individual action against the same defendant at a later time. FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee's note (b)(3).
The Amchem Court rejected both the certification and settlement of the class, holding that
the interests of present and future claimants injured by asbestos were too disparate to resolve in
a unified proceeding. 521 U.S. at. 622-28. The Court took care to note that settlements which do
not treat all potential claimants fairly would be unlikely to receive judicial approval. Id. at 627
( The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected.").
David Luban foreshadowed the rejection of the settlement reached in Amchem nearly two
years earlier in his discussion of settlement agreements generally. Luban, supra note 1, at 2660.
Referring to the Amchem settlement, Luban noted somewhat prophetically that "[t]he selfdealing process by which this particular sausage emerged from the grinder is exceptionally
unappetizing and graphically illustrates the way settling parties can achieve mutual satisfaction
at the expense of those not at the bargaining table." Id.
191. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 832 (discussing the true scope of review as limited to Rule
23(b)(1)(B)).
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dollars of potential liability for injuries caused by asbestos contained
in its products used for industrial applications. 192 Although the
litigants hotly contested the value of Fibreboard as a corporate entity,
both the plaintiff and defendant agreed that the value of the
193
corporation fell far short of the liability that the corporation faced.
Thus, Fibreboard assets, taken alone, satisfied the critical
requirement of a limited fund class action under 23(b)(1)(B); they were
too small to pay out all of the potential claimants. 194 If claimants were
allowed to proceed against Fibreboard in piecemeal fashion, those
litigants who prevailed first would dry up the assets and prevent relief
195
for those plaintiffs whose injuries had not yet materialized.
If the assets of Fibreboard Corporation were the only ones
available to compensate plaintiffs during the litigation, limited fund
certification may have been obtained. But that was not the case.
Fibreboard, in addition to its own assets, had a pool of liability
coverage from two insurers, Continental Casualty Company
96
("Continental") and Pacific Indemnity Company ("Pacific"). 1
Continental and Pacific had both provided Fibreboard with general
liability coverage between 1956 and March 1959 under policies that

192. Id. at 822.
193. The district court had placed the value of Fibreboard at approximately $235 million,
based on an estimate of likely purchase value. Id. at 850-51. The company was acquired in 1997,
however, for $515 million, with an additional $85 million of assumed debt. Id. at 851 n.28.
Nevertheless, the value of the settlement agreement reached between Fibreboard, its insurers,
and the class plaintiffs exceeded $2 billion. Id. at 850. Other commentators have placed some
emphasis on the role the disputed valuation had in reaching settlement of the class. See George
M. Cohen, The "Fair"Is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation and Class Action
Settlements, 8 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 23, 40 (2000) (discussing the valuation of the company as a

factor in determining potential liability); Matthew C. Stiegler, Note, The Uncertain Future of
Limited Fund Settlement Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
78 N.C. L. REV. 856, 864 (2000) (noting that Fibreboard Corporation's relatively small pool of
assets had at one time helped it to avoid ongoing entanglements with asbestos litigation).
194. The Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 23 describe limited fund conditions:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will
necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the interests of other
members who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the case
where claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all
claims. A class action by or against representative .members to settle the validity of
the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by sepa'rate proof of the amount of each
valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes.
195. One of the difficulties of asbestos litigation, discussed in Amchem, is that many
potential plaintiffs who have been exposed to asbestos have not yet become diagnosable. 521 U.S.
at 602-03. Thus, without the class action mechanisms, litigation would simply pay out those who
became symptomatic first.
196. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 822-23.
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had no ceiling on aggregate liability. 197 Reluctant to assume the
massive potential liability of future payouts, Continental and Pacific
challenged their liability under those policies. 198 A California state
court, however, held that the insurance companies were liable for any
injuries caused by exposure to Fibreboard's asbestos products prior to
1959.199 The insurers appealed those decisions and, fearing the fallout
of a possible reversal, Fibreboard and its insurers moved to the
20 0
bargaining table.
As a result of these negotiations, two agreements were reached.
First, the plaintiff class and Fibreboard entered into the "Global
Settlement Agreement," with a total pool of assets of $1.535 billion
dollars. 20 1 Of that amount, $1.525 billion came from the insurers;
although Fibreboard was required to pay the remaining $10 million,
only $500,000 of that amount came out of its own coffers. 20 2 As a
precondition to the "Global Settlement,'! the parties also entered into a
"Trilateral Settlement Agreement." 20 3 The "Trilateral Settlement" was
entered into based on the fear that the "Global Settlement" would not
obtain or be consented to by all parties. 20 4 Under the "Trilateral
Settlement," Continental and Pacific agreed to commit a maximum of
$2 billion to defend against and pay out all asbestos claims. 20 5 Based
on the basic terms reached in the "Trilateral Settlement," the parties
sought class certification and settlement approval in the U.S. District
197. Both policies had payouts of $1 million per occurrence, $500,000 per claim, but no other
limitations. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 822; see also In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1996). The pre-1959
exposure claimants made up the bulk of the potential liability against Fibreboard. Ortiz, 527
U.S. at 823 n.2.
200. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 823-24. The timing of the negotiations between Fibreboard and its
insurers made clear that the threat of reversal was a considerable incentive. The oral argument
in the California appeals court insurance case was scheduled for August 27, 1993. Id. at 824.
Conditional settlement was reached between Fibreboard, its insurers, and the plaintiffs on
August 26, 1993. Id.
201. Id.
202. Fibreboard had additional insurance policies, outside of those provided by Continental
and Pacific, that paid $9.5 million of its $10 million in liability. Id. at 824-25.
203. Id. at 825.
204. Id.
205. The "Trilateral Agreement" essentially gave Pacific and Continental the option to walk
away from the asbestos litigation altogether, at a $2 billion price tag. The "Trilateral Agreement"
required Continental and Pacific to contribute $475 million more than the "Global Settlement"
required. Id. But it ended the insurers' involvement in the litigation, and in the event the "Global
Settlement" failed and the California appeals court affirmed their liability, their potential
exposure might have been as high as $5 billion, making the additional $475 million a rational
investment ($475 million is less than ten percent of the total liability the insurers might have
faced in the worst case scenario mentioned above). See Cohen, supra note 193, at 46-47
(discussing the mathematics of Fibreboard's potential liability).
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Court for the Eastern District of Texas. 20 6 The district court approved
both the certification and the $1.535 "Global Settlement" as "fair,
adequate and reasonable" under Rule 23(e), and a "limited fund"
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 20 7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying, in part,
on expert testimony that suggested the costs to Fibreboard and its
claims would
insurers to defend against all of the potential asbestos
208
deplete all available funds within five to nine years.
The Supreme Court rejected the "Global Settlement" on the
grounds that the assets of Fibreboard and its insurers were not a
"limited fund" under a proper reading of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 20 9 Using a
historical analysis of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), as well as practical
considerations, the Court held that three requirements must be
satisfied in order to invoke the Rule. 210 First, and arguably most
importantly, the Court held that "insufficiency" was required to
sustain a 23(b)(1)(B) certification. 211 To determine insufficiency, the
claims of all potential claimants and the fund available to pay those
claimants are totaled. 212 If the value of the claims exceeds the value of
the funds, insufficiency is satisfied.213 Second, the Court held that the
entire fund available must be distributed to the claimants and that a
206. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 825.
207. Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
208. In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 982 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The district court credited
the testimony of these experts and found that Fibreboard is a limited fund [under Rule
23(b)(1)(B)].").
209. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 848.
210. Id. at 838-39.
211. Id. at 838.
212. Id.
213. Id. A simplified example might help emphasize the point. Assume that a truck strikes a
van carrying ten people. All ten persons inside sustain the same injury-a broken arm and a
broken leg. The compensatory damages for each claimant are valued at $10,000, or $100,000 for
all ten claimants. Assume that the truck driver was not insured and only has $20,000 in assets
to pay the claimants. Under a 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund theory, all ten claimants would receive
$2,000. Although this amount is substantially less than the true value of their claims, a greater
equity is served by this distribution than by allowing the first two successful plaintiffs to deplete
the fund (2 x $10,000 = $20,000), and thereby deny recovery to the remaining eight injured
persons. See Nat'l Sur. Co. v. Graves, 211 Ala. 533, 534 (1924) ("The primary equity of the bill is
the adjustment of claims and the equitable apportionment of a fund provided by law, which is
insufficient to pay the claimants in full.").
This example also helps illustrate the real world contrasts, as valuation of the varying
asbestos claimants (known and unknown) and the total value of Fibreboard's own assets and its
insurance assets poses in itself a formidable judicial task. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 850 ("We have
already alluded to the difficulties facing limited fund treatment of huge numbers of actions for
unliquidated damages arising from mass torts, the first such hurdle being a computation of the
total claims."). But see id. at 877-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("A perfect valuation, requiring
lengthy study by independent experts, is not feasible in the context of such an unusual limited
fund .... I would accept the valuation findings made by the District Court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals as legally sufficient.").
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defendant cannot withhold funds from the claimants in order to give
itself a better deal. 214 Third, in a point closely related to Rule 23(a)
certification, the claimants asserting a common theory of liability
must be treated "equitably among themselves. '2 15 Once plaintiffs with
a common claim are unified within a class, they are entitled to a fair
and equitable pro rata share of the fund. 216 The Court found that the
"Global Settlement" reached by the parties failed to satisfy any of
2 17
these three criteria.
In application of the insufficiency criteria, the Court focused its
attention on the failure to demonstrate true and identifiable limits of
the fund as the Rule requires. 218 The Court noted that while the "fund"
was comprised of both Fibreboard's own assets as well as the value of
the Continental and Pacific insurance policies, no real valuation was
ever made regarding the upper limits of the insurance coverage. 21 9 The
Court questioned the district court's and court of appeals' willingness
to accept the $2 billion value set on the insurance in the "Trilateral
Agreement" as the maximum value of the insurance funds without
"findings independent of the agreement of defendants and conflicted
class counsel." 220 Although the Court did not go so far as to reject any
valuation reached during settlement as improperly collusive, judicial
acceptance of settlement value must be conditioned on "parties of
equal knowledge and negotiating skill [who] agreed upon the figure
221
through arms-length bargaining."
The Court also condemned the settlement as failing the
requirement of equity. 222 They noted with displeasure the significant
number of potential plaintiffs excluded from the agreement. 223 The
problems created by exclusion of certain claimants were compounded
by a strong inference that those claimants were intentionally excluded

214. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 839.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 840-41.
217. Id. at 848. This Note will refer to these requirements in subsequent analysis as
insufficiency (the fund must be insufficient to compensate all claimants fully), entirety (the entire
available fund must go to the class plaintiffs), and equity (the fund must be distributed equitably
among the claimants).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 850.
220. Id. at 853.
221. Id. at 852.
222. Id. at 854.
223. Id. (commenting on the exclusion of plaintiffs who had previously reached conditional
settlements with Fibreboard, but reserved the right to reassert claims "upon development of an
asbestos related malignancy," and plaintiffs with claims still pending against Fibreboard at the
time the settlement was reached).
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in order to facilitate the brokerage of the settlement agreements. 224
Furthermore, the "Global Settlement" lumped together those
claimants whose exposure to the asbestos occurred prior to 1959 with
those claimants whose exposure occurred after that date, 225 despite
the fact that the potential value of these two claims was dramatically
different. 226 Reemphasizing concerns addressed in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor,227 the Court went on to reject the argument that the
desire by plaintiffs to reach a settlement could be used as a unifying
characteristic of the class to smooth over inequities otherwise
contained in the settlement. 228 In order for a settlement with such a
far-reaching effect to pass judicial scrutiny, it must be equitable to all
229
those affected by its terms.
Third, the "Global Settlement" also failed the requirement of
entirety-the full potential of the fund to pay the claimants was not
2 30
going to be distributed to them under the terms of the settlement.
The Court reasoned that the difference between the estimated value of
Fibreboard (conservatively placed at $235 million), and the amount
Fibreboard was contributing from its own assets (only $500,000), was
a disparity in values that was "irreconcilable" with a limited fund
claim. 23 1 The Court implied that although settlement will always
result in the savings of transaction costs spent in defense of numerous
repeated tort claims, those savings should not be used as a bargaining
chip to pressure individual claimants into settlement or to support the
argument that a defendant's own contribution should be discounted by
232
those savings.

224. Id. at 855.
225. Id. at 857.
226. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
227. See 521 U.S. 591, 625-28 (1997) (rejecting claims of a common desire to reach settlement
as a factor properly reserved for legislative, not judicial, consideration).
228. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858 ("The current position is just as unavailing as its predecessor in
Amchem.... [W]e gave the argument no weight .
.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 860.
231. Id. In another question left unanswered by the Court, no definitive statement was given
as to how much of its own assets a company must contribute to a settlement fund, short of
insolvency. It did note, however, that "if limited fund certification is allowed.., where a
company provides only a de minimis contribution to the ultimate settlement fund, the
incentives ... would provide ... companies [the opportunity] to engineer settlements similar to
the one negotiated in this case [and] would ... undermine the protections for creditors built into
the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 860 n.34.
232. Id. at 861. The majority was unwilling to subscribe to the dissent's contention that the
settlement should be approved because the savings in transaction costs would grant the
plaintiffs "more money available than any other effort would likely have done." Id. at 863.
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B. Application of Ortiz to the Smith & Wesson Agreement
As previously discussed, the Hamilton decision was a moderate
step forward in articulating a possible theory for individual tort
claimants to gain compensation from firearm manufacturers for
injuries caused by their products. 233 Moreover, application of the
theory of precedential cascades suggests a judicial willingness to
follow that case in subsequent tort claims. 234 The intervention of the
Agreement skews those prospective outcomes, however, by providing a
serious barrier to individual tort claimants seeking compensatory
damages against Smith & Wesson. 235 Much like defendant Fibreboard,
a clear motivator for Smith & Wesson to enter the Agreement was to
fend off tort claims that it could not defend or pay without
significantly jeopardizing its assets. 236 The federal and local
governments, on the other hand, sought regulatory measures that it

233. See supra Part III.A-C; notes 108-135 and accompanying text. The New York courts and
the Second Circuit remain in agreement that the theory is still viable in a case with more
conclusive evidence than Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
234. See supra Part III.D; notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part IV.
236. Smith & Wesson, at the time of the Agreement, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Tomkins PLC, a very large, wealthy British industrial conglomerate. TOMKINS PLC, ANNUAL
REPORT ON FORM 20-F, 3 (2000), available at http://www.tomkins.co.uk/investors/ 20F2001.pdf
(on file with author). Smith & Wesson was part of Tomkins's "[p]rofessional, garden & leisure
products" division, a group that brought in an operating profit of £20.2 million in the year 2000
(approximately $31.51 million U.S.). Id. at 11. Tomkins's overall profit that same year was
£515.4 million; therefore, Smith & Wesson's division accounted for only about 3.8% of the
company's total profits. Id. at 66. The company's net worth that year was estimated at $6.09
billion. Id.
Tomkins's potential exposure in tort liability was not lost on the company, or on plaintiffs,
who often name it as defendant in negligence lawsuits. In assessing the company's
"Contingencies" the Annual Report noted:
Smith & Wesson has been named as a defendant in some twenty-two cases brought by
the plaintiffs
various municipal authorities in the United States. In these cases ....
are seeking to show that the defendants are liable under a variety of legal
theories .... Tomkins PLC has been named as a defendant [although] it has not been
Smith & Wesson Corp. has entered into an agreement with
served with process ....
an agency of the Federal Government of the United States of America and various of
the municipal plaintiffs... [upon agreement] not to sue Smith & Wesson Corp.
Id.
Although no official reports confirm it, it is not difficult to believe that Tomkins may have
pressured Smith & Wesson to enter the Agreement to deflect potential liability. Nevertheless,
Tomkins apparently still had lingering doubts about its potential tort exposure. It actively
sought buyers for Smith & Wesson. See Tomkins Feels Pinch of Slowdown in U.S. Economy,
WALL ST. J. EUR., (Jan. 17, 2001), at 6 (quoting Tomkins Chairman David Newlands as
reiterating "a commitment to sell its U.S. handgun business Smith & Wesson ... that [doesn't]
fit into the group's strategy"), 2001 WL-WSJE 2840818.
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had tried and failed to achieve through legislative means. 237 Those
governments sought a political indemnity quite similar to the financial
2 38
indemnity sought by Fibreboard's insurers.
Further analysis of the Agreement is predicated on a
discussion of two important factors from Ortiz superficially absent
here: class action certification and judicial scrutiny. First, the
239
litigation settled by the Agreement was not class action litigation.
That difference, however, is not as dispositive as it first appears. The
Agreement, if applied by courts as a defense to subsequent lawsuits, is
likely to have the same prohibitive effect against future individual tort
claimants. The Agreement simultaneously allows Smith & Wesson to
disclaim any negligence for past acts, 240 while the remaining
regulatory commitments in sections I and II prevent future claimants
from substantiating claims of negligence. 241 When these points are
taken together, it becomes increasingly likely that a court could apply
the Agreement as a shield against liability for claims by individuals
residing in the municipalities that have consented to the terms.
Second, the Agreement was not subject to judicial scrutiny, and no
court has passed upon its legality. The concluding provision of the
Agreement, however, call[s] for its enforcement as "a Court order and
as a contract. '' 242 Relying on this provision, Smith & Wesson might call

237. State legislatures in both Colorado and California tried and failed to pass laws allowing
tort products liability actions against firearms manufacturers. The California bill died in

committee. A.B. 988, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997). The Colorado bill was ultimately
vetoed by the state's governor. S.B. 99-205, 62d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.Sess. (Colo. 1999).
238. Then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo vigorously applauded the bill as a major step
forward. He maintained that the Agreement was an important part of "HUD's efforts to reduce
gun violence." Press Release, Cuomo, Gephardt and Other Congress Members Criticize Proposals
to Halt HUD's Gun Safety Efforts and Reduce Budget Request (June 20, 2000) at
http://www.hud.gov.80/library/bookshelfl8/pressrelprO-141.html (on file with author).
239. As discussed above, multiple cities were parties to the Agreement. See supra Part III.D.
Although none of those cities sought or obtained certification of their cases as class actions prior
to the withdrawal of their claims, some commentators have argued that municipal firearm
lawsuits are similar to mass torts, in terms of the representative nature of the action. See Lytton,
supra note 7, at 63 ("Tort suits against gun manufacturers also invite comparison to toxic tort
litigation."). Indeed, the Hamilton plaintiffs invoked this comparison. The plaintiffs there
compared negligent manufacture and distribution of firearms to "a pathogen leading to latent
injuries and the deaths of many thousands of people, much like claims associated with asbestos,
agent orange, the dalkon shield, and silicone gel breast implants." Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
240. The preamble to the Agreement emphasizes that it is a "full and complete settlement of
any and all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the subject litigation."
Agreement, supra note 28, pmbl. 4. It further states that "[niothing in this Agreement ...shall
be construed as an admission by the manufacturer parties to the Agreement that practices they
engaged in prior to the execution of this Agreement were negligent." Id.
241. See supra Part III.D.
242. Agreement, supra note 28, § VIII.
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on this Agreement in subsequent litigation when presented with
negligence claims that parallel the Agreement itself. If later courts
decide sua sponte that they are not bound by the Agreement in
adjudicating negligence claims against Smith & Wesson, then the
reference to Ortiz becomes moot. But where courts choose to apply its
terms against future plaintiffs, legal arguments built around Ortiz
could provide plaintiffs with much-needed defense of the Agreement's
terms.
The Agreement appears to violate the entirety, equity, and
insufficiency principles of Ortiz.243 The facts leading up to the
Agreement appear to indicate clearly that it violates the "entirety"
element from Ortiz. 244 Smith & Wesson executives made it clear that
their own assets would be insufficient to defend against numerous
lawsuits, let alone satisfy the judgments generated by them. 245 The
precise value of Smith & Wesson is difficult to estimate because it is a
foreign-owned, privately held company. 246 But, individual litigants
received no compensation from the Agreement whatsoever. 247 The
"equity" principle may also be violated by the Agreement. Under the
Agreement, both products liability and negligent distribution claims
are dismissed. 248 But, as discussed in Hamilton, the basis for those
claims is independent, and could form the basis for independent
classes. 249 Forging those classes together under the same agreement
without any attempt to address the "conflicting interests" violates the
Ortiz Court's construction of Rule 23.250 Finally, nothing in the
Agreement supports the contention that any attempt was made to
calculate the value of the claims, or Smith & Wesson's ability to pay
them. The Ortiz Court condemned the use of spotty evidence to

243. See supra part III(D).
244. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 236.
247. Smith & Wesson was in fact the party that received compensation for its commitment to
self-regulate. Although not specifically listed in the Agreement, upon signing, Smith & Wesson
became a member of the "Communities for Safer Guns Coalition." Member cities of the coalition
pledge to buy weapons from Smith & Wesson for its police forces, so long as Smith & Wesson is a
signatory of the Agreement. To date, 190 communities have joined the coalition, contributing to
an already sizeable monopoly on provision of law enforcement firearms. See Press Release,
Cuomo and Schumer Announce Safer Guns Coalition Nearly Triples in Size to 190 Communities

(April 27, 2000) (on file with author), at http://www.hud.gov/librarylbookshelf18/pressrel/prOO87.html.
248. See Agreement, supra note 28, §§ I-II.
249. The Hamilton plaintiffs ultimately prevailed only on their negligent distribution claims,
but the case originally alleged products liability as well. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.
2d 802, 843-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
250. See supra Part V.A.
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demonstrate insufficiency; the firearm Agreement failed to offer any
251
evidence whatsoever to support such a claim.
VI.

CONCLUSION-FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The effects of the Smith & Wesson Agreement on future law
are being felt now. Already, the State of Maryland, using the
purchasing power of buying firearms for police officers, has begun to
pressure manufacturers to sign onto the Agreement brokered by
Smith & Wesson, or to adopt a similar agreement. 252 Less than one
month after the Agreement was signed, nearly seventy cities and
municipalities had signed on to a "Pledge for Communities for Safer
Guns," predicating future weapons purchases on manufacturers
becoming party to the Smith & Wesson Agreement. 253 These initial
steps suggested that the ultimate impact of the Agreement could be
widespread. Perhaps the present demise of the Agreement in the Bush
Administration ultimately suggests that it was a tool of policy, not
law, from the very beginning. 254 Nevertheless, there is no reason to
think that the more general discussion regarding the direction of gun
255
control policy will end anytime soon.
The use of the tort system as a response to injuries caused by
negligent firearms manufacturers is still in nascent form. 256 Tort suits
provide a primary channel of compensation for harms; regulation of
firearms, while admirable, does not pay for hospital expenses, relieve
pain and suffering, and may not even deter future conduct. Smith &
Wesson may have considered self-regulation preferable to defense of
251. The Agreement itself contained no references to the potential liability of gun
manufacturers, noting only that the government agreed to "dismiss the manufacturer parties to
the Agreement with prejudice from the lawsuits specified in Appendix A." Agreement, supra note
28, pmbl. 1.
252. Michael Dresser, Maryland to Become First State to Require Internal Firearm Locks,
BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2000, at 1A. This troubling development suggests that the principles of
herding may apply to the Agreement itself. The comparison is particularly apt, as smaller gun
manufacturers may not have the resources to comply with the terms of the Agreement in
earnest. Thus, under the herding principle, an agreement meant to apply to the special factual
considerations of Smith & Wesson, may be forced onto manufacturers whose capabilities vary
greatly.
253. Purchases of weapons for police forces represent a sizeable percentage of gun
manufacturers' total sales, and one of their few sources of legitimate repeat business. Police
agencies are, of course, exempt from any restrictions barring the sale of multiple weapons to a
single buyer. See Timothy McNulty, Councilmen to Urge City to Join Gun Safety Pledge,
PITSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 2000, at C2.

254. See Fields, supra note 35.
255. See Page, supra note 40.
256. See Lytton, supra note 7, at 10-32 (discussing progress and status of firearm negligence
lawsuits).
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individual suits, but that preference offers little comfort to those living
with injuries caused in part by Smith & Wesson's negligence. Its
sizeable portion of the market share 25 7 and the increasing judicial
acceptance of individual tort suits 258 against gun makers make Smith
& Wesson's capitulation to the Agreement a questionable attempt to
sidestep liability. Using the principles implied in Ortiz and Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts should refuse to apply the
Agreement against individual claimants. The Agreement reached
between the government and Smith & Wesson should be considered
an ill-advised attempt to bind settlement members absent from
litigation.
The arguments against the Agreement, drawn from Ortiz, may
simply be matters of policy, not law, now that the Agreement is a dead
letter. The subsequent failure of the Agreement to remain in force
may negate the need for a specific legal rationale to avoid
enforcement. But the specific manner in which the Agreement died
nevertheless speaks volumes about the shortcomings of private
arrangements as a legislative tool, particularly when set into place by
ever-changing presidential administrations. If passed as legislation, a
as
subsequent administration could not have dismissed the Agreement 259
a "memorandum of understanding" not binding on the parties.
Perhaps the Agreement could have served some purpose if challenged
to enforcement. Genuine efforts by Smith & Wesson to comply with its
obligations might have suggested the feasibility of such measures in
future legislation.
In light of these failures, it is important that the next step in
the process of gun control policy is one that moves away from the
negotiating table and back into a public forum. Democracy's core value
is not efficiency; it is the right to participate in the way the laws shape
and govern our lives. Privatization of public law impedes that goal.
Existing public choice theory suggests that legislation and litigation
can continue to be fruitful avenues for future discourse and resolution
of these issues; Ortiz keeps at least one of those avenues open by
providing the judicial tools to set aside the Agreement, if ever pushed
260
to enforcement, as justice dictates.
The lobbying climate suggests that previous obstacles to
meaningful legislation are no longer as steadfastly in place. The still
viable rationale from Hamilton, as animated by the theory of herding,
257.
percent.
258.
259.
260.

More recent reports place Smith & Wesson's market share at approximately nineteen
Editorial, Crack in the Gun Wall, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at B6.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.
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provides a positive prediction for the continued role of the judiciary in
the debate. 26 1 As long as these troubling public issues remain on the
table, they should be debated and resolved in public institutions.
Although private agreements can provide a fast track to change, that
change takes place without the deliberation and safeguards contained
in the legislative process. Privatization legitimizes the choice to ignore
important outside voices, especially those that the negotiating parties
consider unpleasant or simply too costly to listen to. It can serve as a
signal for future roads to take, but it should not do so at the expense of
closing down others.
Charles C. Sipos*

261. The legal rationales from Hamilton appear still to be in use, albeit sparsely. Most
recently, an appellate court in Illinois sustained a public nuisance cause of action by plaintiff
families whose relatives were killed by firearms manufactured by the various defendants. See
Young v. Bryco Arms, No. 98 L 6684, 2001 WL 1665427, at *14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). Smith &
Wesson was among the named defendants. Id.
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